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“Chaos in the world brings uneasiness, but it also allows the 
opportunity for creativity and growth.” 
(Tom Barrett) 
PREFACE  
The world’s ever-increasing instability and chaos is accompanied by ever-louder calls for 
order, structure, and predictability, as individuals feel a strong need to assert and maintain 
a sense of non-randomness in their day-to-day lives. To this purpose, people spend a lot of 
time cleaning up, organizing paperwork, or scheduling their days; strive to know what to 
expect from others (and thus to avoid unpredictable social interactions); enjoy living in a 
stable sociopolitical system; and preferentially choose worldviews and metaphysical 
beliefs that give their lives meaning and order.  
Against this background, it is unsurprising that people often feel overwhelmed when 
faced with making tough personal or economic decisions in chaotic contexts. In such a 
decision making situation, people tend to re-establish order and structure before making a 
choice, since – according to common knowledge – external order contributes to a clear 
mind. Though the amount of chaos vs. order in one’s environment seems to play a key role 
for decision makers, research has scarcely explored the effects of randomness on decision 
making processes.  
The present thesis aims to close this particular research gap, doing so by addressing the 
effects of randomness on a specific phenomenon in individual decision making: 
confirmatory information processing. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical background the 
present research is built upon, discussing the phenomenon of confirmatory information 
processing (including its relevant theoretical models and current empirical findings). The 
chapter then presents the conception of randomness underlying the present research and 
closes by outlining its specific hypotheses. Chapters 2-4 subsequently present three study 
series that explore the influence of distinct dimensions of randomness on confirmatory 
information processing. Finally, Chapter 5 provides a general conclusion to the present 
research.  
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Abstract 
When making a decision, individuals demonstrate a systematic preference for information 
that supports rather than conflicts with their existing beliefs, standpoints, or decisions. This 
phenomenon is known as confirmatory information processing and is observable in 
information search and information evaluation.  
Though prior research has provided initial evidence that confirmatory information 
processing might be affected by randomness that is perceived in the physical, social, and 
metaphysical environment, these relations have not yet been systematically explored. In 
order to close this research gap, the present thesis undertook three study series to 
investigate whether physical randomness (i.e., contextual order), social randomness (i.e., 
perceived personal control), and metaphysical randomness (i.e., order offered by 
metaphysical belief systems) affect confirmatory information processing in social and 
economic decision making. Each of the three study series is presented, theoretically 
embedded, and discussed in its own distinct chapter.  
Collectively, the present data propose that randomness affects confirmatory information 
processing regardless of the environment that it is perceived in. However, the effects of 
physical, social, and metaphysical randomness are not uniform. The results of Study Series 
1 suggest that high physical randomness decreases confirmatory information processing. In 
contrast, Study Series 2 consistently suggests that high social randomness increases 
confirmatory information search, but does not affect confirmatory information evaluation. 
Specifically, high social randomness triggers feelings of helplessness, which in turn lead to 
heightened levels of confirmatory information search. Finally, the results of Study Series 3 
indicate that low metaphysical randomness counteracts confirmatory information 
processing tendencies. Mediational analyses suggested that individuals who were primed 
with religious concepts indicated less commitment to their decision, which resulted in 
decreased levels of confirmatory information processing. Theoretical and practical 
implications for all three study series are discussed. 
1. Background 
Background 
1.1 Confirmatory information processing  
In everyday decision making, individuals are greeted by a plethora of information, which is 
publically accessible on the web, on television, or in newspapers. No matter whether 
people make a personal decision (e.g., Where should I spend my holidays?), or an 
economic decision (e.g., Which company should I invest in?), there are numerous relevant 
arguments for and against each possible decision alternative. However, the full range of 
diverse arguments often remains unexplored, as people tend to prefer information that 
supports rather than challenges their a priori beliefs, standpoints, or decisions. This 
phenomenon is also referred to as confirmatory information processing (Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2008). 
Following a decision, confirmatory information processing can typically be observed in 
information search (a phenomenon also called selective exposure; Frey, 1986) and/or in 
information evaluation (a phenomenon also called biased assimilation; Ditto & Lopez, 
1992; for a recent review, see Fischer & Greitemeyer, 2010; Hart et al., 2009). In 
information search, people tend to preferentially seek out decision-consistent information 
while neglecting decision-inconsistent information. Similarly, when it comes to 
information evaluation, individuals tend to assess decision-consistent information as being 
of higher quality than decision-inconsistent information. 
In general, confirmatory information processing implies both functional and 
dysfunctional aspects. For example, individuals can benefit from confirmatory information 
processing, as it helps them to alleviate negative mood states (e.g., Jonas, Graupmann, & 
Frey, 2006). Furthermore, confirmatory information processing promotes the capacity to 
act in an efficient way, as “a high degree of selectivity […] often save[s] the decision 
maker from unproductive confusion, unnecessary delays, and a waste of his resources in a 
fruitless quest for an elusive, faultless alternative” (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 13). However, 
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confirmatory information processing can severely impair decision quality, as people may 
cling to their decisions even when faced with evidence that contradicts them. In other 
words, individuals may overlook the potential risks of their preferred choice, which can 
lead to poor decision outcomes (Janis, 1982; Nemeth & Rogers, 1996). It is thus important 
to investigate those situational factors and psychological processes that might increase or 
reduce confirmatory information processing. However, before taking a closer look at 
research on confirmatory information processing, the question of why people actually 
engage in it must be addressed. 
1.1.1 Theoretical perspectives  
Over the years, research has offered a rather inconsistent set of frameworks for explaining 
confirmatory information processing, with the majority of models tending to focus on 
confirmatory information search rather than confirmatory information evaluation. 
Nonetheless, these frameworks give important insights into the psychological processes 
that might underlie confirmatory information processing. Three major theoretical 
approaches will be introduced in the following section. These are (a) motivational accounts 
(i.e., dissonance theory; Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986), (b) cognitive accounts (Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Ditto, Scepansky, Munro, Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998; Lord, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1979), and (c) recent accounts that combine motivational and cognitive aspects 
(i.e., the heuristic semantic model; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). 
One traditional (and still major) motivational framework is dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957). According to Festinger (1957), people have a general need for cognitive 
consistency; thus, when two self-relevant cognitions (e.g., attitudes) do not fit together, 
individuals experience dissonance. Dissonance creates the aversive state of psychological 
discomfort (Elliot & Devine, 1994), which motivates individuals to attenuate this aversive 
state by reducing the discrepancy between the incompatible cognitions. This can be done in 
various ways such as adding consonant cognitive elements or subtracting dissonant ones 
(Festinger, 1957; Fischer, Frey, Peus, & Kastenmüller, 2008).  
In the context of dissonance theory, a large body of research suggests that confirmatory 
information search serves as a means of reducing post-decisional dissonance: Once 
individuals have made a decision between two (or more) alternatives, they are met with the 
prospect of having chosen badly, as both the positive aspects of the non-chosen alternative 
and the negative aspects of the chosen alternative become salient. As a consequence, 
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decision makers experience dissonance. However, this adverse and unpleasant 
motivational state can be alleviated if the decision maker seeks out information that is 
consistent with the chosen alternative (i.e., consonant cognitive elements) while neglecting 
inconsistent information (i.e., dissonant cognitive elements) that would further aggravate 
the experience of dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986). In sum, dissonance theory 
postulates that confirmatory information search is a motivational process: Individuals 
select consistent over inconsistent information, as they intend to defend their decision and 
thereby attempt to reduce post-decisional dissonance. 
In strong contrast to dissonance theory, cognitive theorists argue that confirmatory 
information processing might arise because people are unable to demonstrate true 
objectivity when making a decision (Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2005; Fischer, 
Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2008).  
From this perspective, decision makers strive to find the qualitatively best pieces of 
decision-relevant information, but cannot evaluate information quality independent of their 
own standpoint. Because of this, individuals test inconsistent information more critically 
and extensively than consistent information, which is why inconsistent information is 
generally ascribed lower quality than consistent information (biased assimilation; Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 1998). As a by-product of the systematic devaluation of 
inconsistent information, decision makers systematically seek out consistent information 
while neglecting inconsistent information.  
Thus, compared to dissonance theoretical explanations, cognitive models not only 
address selective exposure, but also give insights into the processes of biased assimilation. 
In addition, cognitive models suggest that confirmatory information search might not 
necessarily be a deliberate process, but may rather represent an unintended consequence of 
confirmatory information evaluation (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). Therefore, this perspective 
suggests that selective exposure is primarily due to cognitive processes. 
Though the motivational and cognitive accounts explain confirmatory information 
processing by exclusive means of their titular processes, more recent frameworks suggest 
that such views might be too restrictive, as both motivation and cognition can affect 
confirmatory information processing. One account that combines both motivational and 
cognitive factors is the heuristic systematic model (HSM; Chaiken et al., 1989).  
According to the HSM, people can engage either in systematic or heuristic information 
processing (Chaiken, 1980, 1987). While systematic information processing is associated 
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with balanced (i.e., unbiased) information processing following a decision, heuristic 
information processing is related to confirmatory information processing. Which 
processing style is triggered depends on both the cognitive capacities of information 
seekers and their underlying motivations: High cognitive capacities promote balanced 
information processing, whereas confirmatory information processing is more likely when 
cognitive capacities are constrained. As far as motivational influences are concerned, the 
HSM considers three basic motivations that can affect the intensity of information 
processing: defense, impression, and accuracy motivation. These three motivations will 
now be discussed in turn. 
In line with dissonance theory, the HSM suggests that individuals’ motivations to 
defend or justify their standpoints, beliefs, or decisions typically increase confirmatory 
information processing. This motivational concern is referred to as defense motivation and 
serves the intrapersonal goal of protecting the decision maker’s self-concept.  
In contrast, impression motivation arises from an individual’s desire to satisfy 
interpersonal goals; that is, the decision maker aims to achieve favorable social 
consequences (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Fischer, & Frey, 2006; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 
2005). Impression motivation usually leads to selective information processing, but this 
kind of selectivity can be adapted to the salient social goal: Either inducing a bias in favor 
of a significant other’s standpoint if one’s own opinion has not been publically disclosed 
yet (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998; Nemeth & Rogers, 1996) or biasing information processing 
in favor of one’s own standpoint if the significant other is already aware of it (Tetlock, 
1992).  
Finally, accuracy motivation touches upon a decision maker’s goal to form an accurate 
appraisal of their environment. Due to accuracy motivation, individuals critically examine 
their standpoints or decisions by means of systematically searching for supporting and 
conflicting information (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998). Although accuracy motivation is often 
associated with balanced information processing in the context of the HSM, accuracy 
concerns can promote confirmatory information processing when “judgment-relevant 
information is scarce or cognitive capacity is constrained“ (Chen & Chaiken, 1999, p. 77). 
In sum, the HSM extends approaches that focus on either motivation or cognition by 
considering both factors to predict biases in information processing. 
Though various theoretical frameworks for approaching confirmatory information 
processing have been presented during its course of research, one classic paradigm for 
empirically assessing confirmatory information search and evaluation has persisted over 
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time. The so-called ‘selective exposure paradigm’ has its roots in dissonance theory 
(Festinger, 1957) and is particularly well suited to capture confirmatory information 
processing. In the next section, this paradigm – and its recent empirical findings – shall be 
addressed.  
1.1.2 The classic paradigm and current research 
In the classic selective exposure paradigm, participants work on a decision problem that 
allows them to choose between two alternatives (e.g., whether a manager named Mr. 
Miller should have his employment contract extended or not; Fischer, Greitemeyer, et al., 
2008). After receiving some background information on the decision problem, participants 
make a preliminary decision (i.e., they indicate whether they favor or oppose extending the 
contract).  
Participants are then given the opportunity to search for and/or evaluate additional 
pieces of information on the decision problem. This information supposedly consists of a 
number of one-page comments written by experts on the topic (e.g., 12 pieces of 
information). Participants are told that they will receive an overview sheet that presents 
each comment in the form of a short statement (typically 1-3 sentences), in order to 
facilitate information search and/or evaluation. Importantly, half of the statements are 
clearly in favor of one alternative (e.g., “Mr. Miller shows intuition and sensitivity for new 
trends and developments in the fashion industry. His creative ideas might facilitate 
entering new sales markets. Therefore, his contract should be extended.”), whereas half of 
the statements explicitly support the other alternative (e.g., “Mr. Miller has just copied 
competitors’ business ideas. Thus, his business strategy has doubtful prospects of success. 
Therefore, his contract should not be extended.”). This ensures that, regardless of the 
decision maker’s preliminary preference, 50% of the statements are consistent with their 
choice and 50% are inconsistent with it.  
After receiving the overview sheet containing summaries of all the available statements, 
participants indicate which pieces of information they would like to read in more detail 
later on (i.e., information search) and/or assess the expected quality of all of the pieces of 
information with regard to their credibility and importance (i.e., information evaluation). 
They then make a final decision (see Figure 1.1). Confirmatory information search can be 
observed if participants seek out more consistent information than inconsistent 
information. Similarly, confirmatory information evaluation occurs if participants assess 
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consistent information as being of higher quality than inconsistent information. Since 
recent research has shown that selective exposure and biased assimilation are strongly 
interconnected, both phenomena have been subsumed under the term ‘confirmatory 
information processing’ (e.g., Fischer, Fischer, Weisweiler, & Frey, 2010; Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, et al., 2008). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The classic selective exposure paradigm. 
As far as empirical research on confirmatory information processing is concerned, biases 
in information search and evaluation have been shown to be widespread in decision 
making. For example, studies have revealed that selective exposure occurs in individual 
(Fischer, Greitemeyer, et al., 2008) and group (Greitemeyer, Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, & 
Frey, 2006) decision making and can occur during both preliminary (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, 
Frey, & Thelen, 2001) and final (Frey, 1986) decisions. Joining the vast majority of 
studies, the present research investigates confirmatory information processing in individual 
decision making following a preliminary choice by utilizing the classic selective exposure 
paradigm. 
Although individuals share a general tendency to prefer decision-consistent over 
decision-inconsistent information, confirmatory information processing can be affected by 
a variety of moderators, both related and unrelated to the decision making process. A 
significant amount of research has been conducted to explore the moderating factors that 
are tied to the decision making process. For example, researchers have shown that selective 
exposure is more likely when the amount of available information is limited (Fischer et al., 
2005); information is presented sequentially rather than simultaneously (Jonas et al., 
2001); the information search process has just begun (Fischer, Lea, et al., 2011); the 
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decision is gain-framed rather than loss-framed (Fischer, Jonas, Frey, & Kastenmüller, 
2008); or when the decision maker focuses on the decision rather than on the information 
(Jonas, Traut-Mattausch, Frey, & Greenberg, 2008).  
However, there is far less research identifying or examining those moderators of 
confirmatory information processing that are not a direct part of the decision making 
process per se. This includes the potential impact of everyday situational factors, one such 
factor being the amount of randomness decision makers face in their environment. The 
present thesis attempts to fill this gap by investigating the effects of randomness on 
confirmatory information processing. To approach this research question, the next section 
offers a closer look at the conceptualization of randomness the present research is based 
on. 
1.2 Randomness: A working model  
Randomness is typically referred to as a lack of order in one’s environment (Rutjens, van 
der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2010). Therefore, an exploration of randomness should 
consider precisely where people are confronted with randomness in their day-to-day lives. 
This thesis addresses three distinct living environments in which randomness can be found, 
namely (a) the physical environment, (b) the social environment, and (c) the metaphysical 
environment (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009). 
In the physical environment, randomness strongly depends on the amount of contextual 
order (van Harreveld, Rutjens, Schneider, Nohlen, & Keskins, 2014; Whitson & Galinsky, 
2008). For example, contextual disorder (e.g., a conference room full of clutter; a messy 
desk in a public office) typically conveys the visual impression of high randomness, 
whereas contextual order (e.g., well-organized filing shelves in an administration 
department; the tidy office of one’s superior) is associated with low randomness. This 
specific dimension of randomness will be referred to as physical randomness for the 
remainder of the present thesis.  
In the social environment, randomness addresses the extent to which individuals 
perceive themselves as having personal control over a situation (Kay, Gaucher, Napier, 
Callan, & Laurin, 2008). People who perceive having low levels of personal control (e.g., 
following a global financial crisis) typically receive the impression of high randomness, 
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whereas those who perceive high levels of personal control consider their social worlds to 
be less random and more predictable. The dimension of randomness that relates to 
perceived personal control is hereafter referred to as social randomness. 
In the metaphysical environment, randomness is strongly connected to questions 
regarding the origin of the universe and thus the life within it (Rutjens, van der Pligt, et al., 
2010). In other words, perceived randomness in the metaphysical environment depends on 
the degree of sense, order, and structure that is offered by metaphysical belief systems. 
While worldviews that “acknowledge that the controllability of life’s outcomes is limited 
and allow for uncertainty” (Rutjens, van der Pligt, et al., 2010, p. 1078) give much room 
for perceptions of randomness (e.g., Darwin’s Theory of Evolution), the “belief in God as a 
controlling agent thwarts notions of randomness in the universe and provides order” 
(Rutjens, van der Pligt, et al., 2010, p. 1078). Randomness that is experienced in the 
metaphysical environment will subsequently be called metaphysical randomness.  
The question of whether randomness has an impact on human affect, motivation, and 
cognition has been preoccupying experts for some time. A valuable line of research in this 
field has used a very broad conception of randomness for investigating its effects. In 
particular, researchers have primed abstract concepts that are semantically linked to the 
term ‘randomness’ (e.g., chaotic, disorder, random, haphazard; Kay, Moscovitch, & 
Laurin, 2010; Legare & Souza, 2013) in order to induce the impression of randomness. 
Other lines of research have instead focused on just one of the previously mentioned 
dimensions of randomness. For instance, researchers have found that contextual order (i.e., 
low physical randomness) promotes generosity (Vohs, Redden, & Rahinel, 2013); that low 
perceived levels of personal control (i.e., high social randomness) increase pattern 
perception (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008); and that religious priming (i.e., low metaphysical 
randomness) attenuates feelings of authorship (Dijksterhuis, Preston, Wegner, & Aarts, 
2008). 
Although there have been numerous studies on varying aspects of randomness, prior 
research has failed to directly compare the consequences of distinct dimensions of 
randomness for a common outcome variable. In addition, previous research has largely 
neglected the possible impact of randomness on decision making processes such as 
confirmatory information processing. Against this empirical background, the central 
questions that motivate this thesis are: Do (a) physical, (b) social, and (c) metaphysical 
randomness affect confirmatory information processing in personal and economic decision 
making and if so, do these different facets of randomness affect confirmatory information 
Background 17 
processing in the same way? The detailed outline of the present thesis is covered in the 
next section. 
1.3 Scope of the present thesis 
The present dissertation aims to produce a more complete understanding of the effects of 
randomness on confirmatory information processing following personal and economic 
decisions. This research is based on a threefold conception of randomness. Concretely, 
three study series were conducted to empirically explore whether (a) physical randomness, 
(b) social randomness, and (c) metaphysical randomness affect confirmatory information 
processing. In all study series, the classic selective exposure paradigm was employed to 
measure confirmatory information processing. For the decision cases, personal decision 
problems (e.g., decisions on medical treatments) as well as economic decision problems 
(e.g., investment decisions) were utilized so that findings would be relevant and applicable 
to a large number of day-to-day decisions. The study series are presented in the following 
three chapters.  
As a first step in the present research, Chapter 2 describes a study series on the effect 
of physical randomness on confirmatory information processing. Based on previous 
research, it was hypothesized that contextual disorder would decrease confirmatory 
information processing. This hypothesis was tested over the course of two studies 
(Studies 1-2). In Study 1, participants in a disorderly room were expected to engage in less 
confirmatory information processing than decision makers in an orderly room. By means 
of semantic priming procedures, Study 2 aimed to determine whether a mindset of 
divergent thinking might be a precondition for the relationship between physical disorder 
and confirmatory information processing. 
The study series described in Chapter 3 aimed to investigate the impact of social 
randomness on confirmatory information processing. Building on recent research, four 
studies explored whether perceiving oneself as having a low level of personal control 
affects selectivity in information search and evaluation. Perceptions of low control were 
expected to increase selective exposure while having no impact on biased assimilation 
(Studies 3-6). In addition, three possible explanations for the effect of low control on 
confirmatory information search were addressed; namely increased feelings of general 
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threat (Study 4); a heightened need for cognitive closure (Study 5); and increased levels of 
helplessness (Study 6). Finally, Study 6 also explored how personal consequences for the 
decision maker might affect the relationship between low control and confirmatory 
information search. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with the question of whether metaphysical randomness affects 
confirmatory information processing. The aim of its study series was to investigate 
whether priming a metaphysical belief system that typically offers a sense of order and 
non-randomness (i.e., religion) affects confirmatory information processing. More 
specifically, five studies examined whether religious primes reduce confirmatory 
information processing in secular decision scenarios (Studies 7-11). In addition, these 
studies aimed to shed more light on the processes that underlie the effect of religious 
priming on confirmatory information processing. To that end, it was analyzed whether 
decreased psychological discomfort (Study 8), the activation of religion-related concepts 
(Study 9), or a shift of thoughts away from the secular decision (Study 10 and 11) could 
account for the proposed effect. 
The final chapter of the present thesis (Chapter 5) summarizes and discusses the 
present research with particular attention paid to the theoretical and practical implications 
of its findings. In addition, this chapter includes a discussion of the limitations of the 
approach taken here as well as suggestions for future undertakings. 
 
2. Physical randomness and decision making: The 
impact of contextual disorder on confirmatory 
information processing 
Physical randomness and decision making 
2.1 Abstract 
The present research encompassed two studies (Studies 1 and 2) investigating whether 
contextual disorder – a factor that is typically irrelevant to a given decision case yet can 
significantly influence decision quality – affects confirmatory information processing. 
Based on prior research, it was hypothesized that contextual disorder would be associated 
with decreases in confirmatory information processing. Study 1 supported this prediction, 
revealing that decision makers in untidy environments evinced less confirmatory 
information processing than decision makers in tidy environments. Study 2 replicated this 
finding, and also demonstrated that divergent thinking is an important precondition of the 
relationship between disorder and confirmatory information processing. 
2.2 Background 
In the aftermath of making a decision, individuals often engage in a phenomenon known as 
confirmatory information processing (Fischer, Greitemeyer, et al., 2008). This refers to a 
tendency whereby individuals demonstrate a systematic preference for information that 
supports their decision (i.e., is decision-consistent) over information that conflicts with it 
(i.e., is decision-inconsistent). Confirmatory information processing can be observed in 
both post-decisional information search (a phenomenon called selective exposure; Frey, 
1986) and information evaluation (biased assimilation; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; for a recent 
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review, see also Fischer & Greitemeyer, 2010; Hart et al., 2009). It is important to study 
this tendency, as it can severely impair the quality of decision making by dissuading the 
revision of incorrect decisions (Janis, 1982; Kray & Galinsky, 2003). Given that this can 
result in severe decision failures, it is highly valuable for research to investigate the 
situational variables and psychological processes that may promote or deter confirmatory 
information processing and thus its impact upon decision quality. One such situational 
variable is a disorderly environment.  
The current literature on confirmatory information processing has paid much attention 
to situational factors directly associated with the decision making process. These include 
decision framing (Fischer, Jonas, et al., 2008); modes of decision making (Fischer et al., 
2010); and decision reversibility (Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009; Jonas et al., 2001). 
However, little is known about the influence of external factors that are not part of the 
decision making process per se. Though there has been some empirical research on the 
effects of extreme situations (such as threatening events) on confirmatory information 
processing (e.g., Fischer, Kastenmüller, et al., 2011; Jonas, Greenberg, & Frey, 2003), less 
attention has been paid to everyday decision contexts such as the characteristics of 
workplaces where important decisions are made. This chapter examines whether the 
tidiness of a physical environment can affect confirmatory information processing. It is 
assumed that compared to orderly decision making contexts, disorderly contexts can 
reduce confirmatory information processing.  
2.2.1 Confirmatory information processing 
Confirmatory information processing tendencies have been reported in a wide range of 
domains including attitudes (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998), stereotypes (Johnston, 1996), and 
self-serving conclusions (Holton & Pyszczynski, 1989). With regard to decision making, 
confirmatory biases have been consistently found in both individual (Frey, 1986; Jonas et 
al., 2001) and group decision making (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000). 
The question of why people engage in confirmatory information processing can be 
answered by considering either motivational or cognitive processes.  
One major explanatory motivational framework is cognitive dissonance theory. This 
approach argues that confirmatory information processing is a means of reducing post-
decisional dissonance. After making a decision, individuals are faced with the prospect of 
having chosen badly and this uneasiness and uncertainty manifests as the aversive 
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motivational state of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986). However, this can 
be alleviated if the individual systematically seeks out information that is consistent with 
their decisional standpoint and thus reifies it.  
From a more cognitive point of view, biased information processing can be explained 
via a tendency to test information that conflicts with one´s decision more critically than 
information that supports it (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 1998).  
In the classic experimental selective exposure paradigm, participants work on a decision 
problem that requires them to choose between two decision alternatives. For example, they 
may have to decide whether to support a diet food business or an organic food business, or 
whether a shop manager’s contract should be extended or not (see Fischer, Greitemeyer, et 
al., 2008). After making a preliminary decision, participants then search for and/or evaluate 
a number of pieces of additional information, which are either consistent or inconsistent 
with their preliminary decision. Once this stage is completed, they make a final decision. 
Confirmatory information processing is typically indicated by the presence of (a) the 
confirmation bias (i.e., participants seeking out more decision-consistent information than 
decision-inconsistent information) and (b) the evaluation bias (i.e., participants evaluating 
decision-consistent information as being of higher quality – more important, more credible 
– than decision-inconsistent information). Because the confirmation and evaluation biases 
have been shown to strongly interconnect, recent research has combined both indicators 
into an overall index of confirmatory information processing (Fischer et al., 2010; Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2005). The two present studies investigate 
confirmatory information processing as a function of contextual disorder. 
2.2.2 Contextual disorder and confirmatory information processing 
Contextual disorder is prevalent in everyday life, being present in both homes and 
workplaces. In fact, an entire industry is devoted to it: Professional organizers offer their 
services to individuals struggling with chaos and chain stores sell organizational aids to 
assist in the elimination of physical clutter (Abrahmson & Freedman, 2007). Varying lines 
of research on disorder have emphasized that the consequences of such disorder are mostly 
negative. For example, studies based on the Broken Windows Theory (Wilson & Kelling, 
1982) have provided evidence that it triggers further disorder (e.g., littering) and facilitates 
the violation of social norms (Keizer, Lindenberg, & Steg, 2008). Furthermore, research in 
organizational psychology has shown that chaotic working environments are typically 
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considered indicative of a cluttered mind. In particular, office holders’ intelligence is 
evaluated more negatively when their desks are messy (Elsbach & Pratt, 2007; Sitton, 
1984). Because the neatness of employees’ workspaces affects the assessment of their 
professional abilities, disorganized desks might have negative career implications.  
However, while disordered environments require more attention to be processed and 
can thus divert resources away from relevant behaviors (Kaiser, Stein, & Peelen, 2014; 
McMains & Kastner, 2011), they may be beneficial for tasks requiring cognitive processes 
that rely on open thinking. Evidence for this assumption comes from studies showing that 
distracting environments can promote fresh insights. One such study was conducted by 
Baird et al. (2012), who argued that a context associated with higher levels of mind-
wandering stimulates creative thinking. Similarly, Dijksterhuis and Meurs (2006) showed 
that a distraction made participants generate more items diverging from a given cue than 
subjects who focused on the task instruction. In addition, Vohs et al. (2013, Study 2) 
reported that participants who were sitting in a disorderly room developed more creative 
ideas about alternative uses for ping-pong balls than participants who were sitting in an 
orderly room. Importantly, the researchers also pointed out that disorderly environments 
can affect preference and choice by leading individuals to break free from conventional 
routes of decision making (see Study 1). Untidy, disorderly environments can thus be 
considered environmental contexts that may encourage unconventional and open thought 
processes. 
Similar observations have recently been made in research on confirmatory information 
processing. In particular, studies have shown that high levels of distraction and creative 
thought (which typically result from disorder) are also associated with openness to 
diverging information. With regard to distraction, Fischer et al. (2010) found that 
participants who were distracted from a decision problem by a short concentration task 
exhibited weaker tendencies toward confirmatory information processing compared to 
individuals who were not distracted. As far as creative thought processes are concerned, 
Schwind, Buder, Cress, and Hesse (2012) showed that decision-inconsistent 
recommendations in web-based learning environments foster divergent thinking (a 
thinking style that is strongly related with creativity; see also Guilford, 1967) and also lead 
to lower levels of confirmatory information search. These results suggest that distraction 
and creative thinking may go hand in hand with balanced information processing. 
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2.2.3 The present research 
As distracting contexts (such as contextual disorder) have been shown to benefit open-
minded and unconventional information processing in different fields of research, it was 
hypothesized that a disorderly context – namely, an untidy room – leads to lower levels of 
confirmatory information processing in decision making situations. Two studies 
investigated this research question. In the first study, we predicted that making a decision 
in an untidy room would be associated with lower levels of confirmatory information 
processing than making a decision in a tidy room. In the second study, we attempted to 
replicate the findings of the first study by using a priming procedure and also investigated 
the role of divergent thinking.  
2.3 Study 1 
In this study, participants worked on an information search and evaluation task in either a 
standard, tidy room (low disorder condition) or a very untidy, messy room (high disorder 
condition). It was predicted that the participants in the untidy room would be less biased in 
their information search and evaluation than participants in the tidy room. 
2.3.1 Method 
Participants and design 
Forty (24 female; 16 male) students at the University of Regensburg participated in 
exchange for course credit (age ranged from 19 to 75 years; M = 26.83, SD = 12.54). The 
study consisted of a one-factorial design with two between-subjects conditions (disorder: 
high vs. low). 
Materials and procedure 
To manipulate the orderliness of the experimental lab, participants worked on the decision 
case either in a tidy room (low disorder condition) or a very untidy room (high disorder 
condition). In the high disorder condition, the experimenter had emptied the contents of a 
waste bin on the floor, rearranged the chairs and the tables in a chaotic way, and scattered 
other items such as coat hangers, CD covers, and newspapers all over the room. In 
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contrast, the low disorder condition had the experimental room looking as it would be 
expected to in any psychological institute: There were two desks with chairs, with 
newspapers and other objects being neatly arranged on a shelf. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two rooms/conditions. 
Then, participants read about a fictitious decision case. They were asked to imagine that 
they were the owner of a fashion store and were told that the work of that store’s manager, 
Mr. Miller, had been of mixed success. After reading some background information about 
Mr. Miller, participants were asked to make a tentative decision as to whether his contract 
should be extended. Upon making their preliminary decision, participants were informed 
that additional information about the decision case was available. This additional 
information consisted of 12 one-page statements written by Mr. Miller’s colleagues. 
Participants received a list that contained the key points of each statement, which had been 
summarized in 2-3 sentences that made it clear whether the colleague was for or against 
the extension of Mr. Miller’s contract. An example of a summary describing a favorable 
statement was: “Mr. Miller shows intuition and sensitivity for new trends and 
developments in the fashion industry. His creative ideas might facilitate entering new sales 
markets. Therefore his contract should be extended.” An example of a summary describing 
a critical statement was: “Mr. Miller has just copied competitors’ ideas. Thus, his business 
strategy has doubtful prospects of success. Therefore, his contract should not be extended.” 
There were six statements favoring the contract’s extension and six statements rejecting it, 
meaning that, regardless of their preliminary decision, participants were faced with six 
decision-consistent and six decision-inconsistent statements. Participants evaluated the 
expected quality of all of the available statements with regard to their credibility (“How 
credible do you expect this information to be?”; 0 = not at all, 10 = extremely) and 
importance (“How important will this information be for making a good decision?”; 
0 = not at all, 10 = extremely). They also indicated whether they would like to read the 
corresponding article in detail later on. Participants could freely select among the 
statements (0-12 pieces of information) by ticking a box near each one. We computed 
difference values for information reliability, information importance, and information 
search by subtracting the corresponding values for decision-inconsistent information from 
the values for decision-consistent information. For the following analyses, the three 
difference scores were transformed into z-values and collapsed into an overall index of 
confirmatory information processing (α = .84). 
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After the participants finished the information search and evaluation task, they were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they perceived the experimental lab to be untidy 
(0 = not at all, 10 = extremely). They were also asked to what extent they experienced 
cognitive disorder throughout the experimental session (“To what extent did you feel 
confused during the experimental session?”; 1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). Participants 
were then fully debriefed and told that there were no extended versions of the articles, as 
this was not necessary for the testing of the hypotheses. 
2.3.2 Results 
Confirmatory information processing 
We checked for the typical effect of confirmatory information processing (i.e., the 
preference for decision-consistent information over decision-inconsistent information) with 
one-sample t-tests against zero. The results indicated a significant confirmatory bias in the 
low disorder condition (M = 0.39, SD = 0.65), t(19) = 2.71, p = .01, but a marginally 
significant disconfirmation bias in the high disorder condition (M = -0.39, SD = 0.90), 
t(19) = -2.00, p = .07. 
A one-way ANOVA revealed that participants in the untidy room (high disorder 
condition; M = -0.39, SD = 0.90) showed significantly lower levels of confirmatory 
information processing than those in the tidy room (low disorder condition; M = 0.39, 
SD = 0.65), F(1, 38) = 10.02, p = .003, ² = .21. Cell means and standard deviations for the 
number of decision-consistent and decision-inconsistent pieces of information searched for 
(and for the confirmation bias) are shown in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations for information search and combined z-
transformed confirmation bias (search and evaluation) as a function of experimental 
condition in Study 1. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
(combined) b 
Disorder M SD  M SD  M SD 
High (n = 20) 
Low (n = 20) 
3.05 
4.05 
2.04 
1.50 
 
2.50 
2.55 
1.36
1.32
 
-0.39 
0.39 
0.90 
0.65 
Notes. a Six pieces of information were available in each category. b This ‘confirmation bias’ corresponds to 
the z-transformed combination of the information search bias and information evaluation biases. 
 
Check for interfering effects 
We checked for potential interfering effects of gender and age by conducting a 2 (disorder: 
high vs. low) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) ANCOVA with age as a covariate and 
confirmatory information processing as the dependent variable. Participants’ age or gender 
did neither significantly influence confirmatory information processing nor interact with 
the disorder manipulation (Fs < 0.12, ps > .73).  
Perceptions of the environment  
Participants perceived the tidy room (M = 8.60, SD = 1.54) as being significantly more tidy 
than the untidy room (M = 3.00, SD = 2.85), F(1, 38) = 59.94, p < .001, ² = .61. 
Participants in the untidy room also reported higher levels of cognitive disorder (M = 1.85, 
SD = 1.18) than those in the tidy room (M = 1.20, SD = 0.52), F(1, 38) = 5.06, p = .03, 
² = .12. Thus, the manipulation of contextual disorder was successful. 
To check whether perceived tidiness or cognitive disorder could mediate the effect of 
contextual disorder on confirmatory information processing, we correlated perceived 
tidiness and cognitive disorder with confirmatory information processing, but did not find 
any significant relationships (rs < .18, ps > .30). It thus seems that these perceptions and 
judgments do not mediate the relationship between contextual disorder and confirmatory 
information processing.  
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2.3.3 Discussion 
Study 1 showed that decision-relevant information processing can be affected by the 
environmental context. Participants in an untidy room were not only significantly less 
biased in the processing of new information than individuals working in a tidy room, but 
they also preferred decision-inconsistent information over decision-consistent information. 
This finding is in line with previous studies, which have found that distraction can improve 
decision quality (Dijksterhuis, 2004) and also encourages unconventional thought 
processes in decision making situations (Vohs et al., 2013).  
However, Study 1 had significant limitations. First, an untidy room may not only be an 
environmental prime for disorder, but also a violation of participants’ expectations that a 
professional university space should be regular and tidy. Previous studies have shown that 
expectancy violation promotes more flexible and creative cognitive processing (Ritter et 
al., 2012; see also Mikulincer & Arad, 1999). Ritter et al. (2012) provided evidence that 
being involved in an unexpected event facilitates cognitive flexibility, which is a 
characteristic of divergent thinking (see also Guilford, 1967). Thus, it might not have been 
the untidy room/contextual disorder per se that weakened confirmatory information 
processing tendencies in our high disorder condition, but rather that being in an untidy 
laboratory room violated participants’ expectations of orderliness, which in turn promoted 
divergent thought processes and led to a reduction in confirmatory information processing.  
Second, the restrictions of the disorder manipulation left us without a baseline control 
group, void of any manipulation of contextual disorder. Consequently, while the 
replication of the basic confirmatory information processing effect in the low disorder 
condition suggests that the difference between experimental groups was driven by disorder, 
we cannot state this with certainty.  
Finally, though we did not find that perceived tidiness or cognitive disorder mediated 
the effect of contextual disorder on confirmatory information processing, the potential role 
of divergent thinking was not tested directly. To address these shortcomings, we conducted 
Study 2.  
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2.4 Study 2  
Study 2 attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1 incorporating a control group and 
using a priming procedure as a more subtle manipulation of contextual disorder. We also 
sought to elucidate the process underlying our main result more directly by introducing 
divergent thinking as an additional independent variable. Furthermore, a different decision 
case was employed with the goal of examining whether our findings would occur in a 
decision scenario with greater levels of personal involvement. It was hypothesized that if 
the effect of contextual disorder upon confirmatory information processing was simply due 
to the mental activation of disorder concepts, participants primed with disorder would 
exhibit weaker confirmatory information processing tendencies compared to participants 
given either an orderly or neutral prime. However, if divergent thought processes induced 
via the violation of participants’ expectations were required to reduce confirmatory 
information processing tendencies, disorder primes would only attenuate confirmatory 
information processing when a mindset of divergent thinking is salient. 
2.4.1 Method 
Participants and design 
One hundred and eighty-eight participants were recruited at the campus of the University 
of Regensburg. Twenty-four subjects were excluded from the dataset because of missing 
data (11), suspicion (6), or the revision of their preliminary decision (7). The final sample 
consisted of 164 participants (113 female and 51 male, ages ranged from 17 to 79 years; 
M = 27.41, SD = 12.34). The study consisted of a 3 (disorder: high vs. low vs. control) x 2 
(divergent thinking: high vs. low) between-subjects design.  
Materials and procedure 
Participants were informed that they would be taking part in two unrelated studies; the first 
being a vocabulary pretest for an upcoming experiment (actually the manipulation of 
divergent thinking and disorder) and the second a public opinion poll on tuition fees (the 
decision case). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six experimental 
conditions. 
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For the manipulation of divergent thinking, we selected two word pairs (e.g., elephant-
hippopotamus and dog-cat) from one of five semantic categories (foods, animals, tools, 
vehicles, clothes) and presented them in a balanced order. In the high divergent thinking 
condition, participants were asked to generate as many words as they could come up with 
that would describe the differences between the two words. This task is similar to the one 
provided by Coskun (2005), who used it to induce a mindset of divergent thinking in his 
participants. In the low divergent thinking condition, participants rated how frequently the 
two words are used in everyday speech (0 = not at all, 9 = very frequently) and indicated 
which of them is used more frequently. 
To manipulate disorder without violating participants’ expectations, we used the 
scrambled sentence paradigm (Srull & Wyer, 1979). Participants were asked to form 20 
grammatically correct four-word sentences by eliminating a redundant word from a set of 
five words. In the high disorder condition, half of the sentences contained words associated 
with disorder (e.g., untidy, messy, disordered). In the low disorder condition, half of the 
sentences contained words related to order (e.g., neat, tidy, ordered). In the control 
condition we used neutral words, unrelated to messiness or tidiness (e.g., long, silver, 
dark).  
The decision case was based on a highly relevant topic for students – the abolition of 
tuition fees at Bavarian universities (Germany). Since 2006, students have had to pay 
tuition fees at universities in several German federal states, including the University of 
Regensburg in Bavaria. In subsequent years, many federal states abolished tuition fees, but 
they were still being charged in Bavaria at the time of the study. Tuition fees were thus a 
major, relevant socio-political topic for students at that time and were the subject of 
significant debate. After reading some background information, participants stated whether 
they felt tuition fees should be abolished or not. Upon completing the decision case, 
participants were informed that additional information about tuition fees was available. 
This information consisted of 12 one-page statements written by experts on the topic. 
Participants received an overview that contained the key points of each statement 
(summarized in 1-2 sentences). Of the 12 pieces of information, six supported abolishing 
tuition fees and six supported preserving them. Consequently, participants were presented 
with six pieces of decision-consistent information and six pieces of decision-inconsistent 
information regardless of their preliminary choice. 
An example of an argument supporting the abolition of tuition fees was: “Tuition fees 
should be abolished because all citizens have the right to study at a university, irrespective 
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of their social background. Particularly in the education sector, equal opportunities should 
be created.” An example of an argument supporting the preservation of tuition fees was: 
“Tuition fees should be charged because they provide the opportunity to raise the standards 
of education at universities (e.g., more qualified teaching staff, intensive supervision).” 
Subjects rated the quality (credibility and importance) of each statement (0 = not at all, 
10 = extremely) and indicated whether they would like to read the corresponding article.1 
As in Study 1, we computed the difference values for information reliability, information 
importance, and information search by subtracting the corresponding values for decision-
inconsistent information from the values for decision-consistent information. Prior to 
further analyses, these difference scores were transformed into z-values and integrated into 
an overall index of confirmatory information processing (α = .85). After the participants 
finished the information search and evaluation tasks, they were debriefed with particular 
reference to the fact that the extended versions of the articles did not truly exist.  
2.4.2 Results 
Manipulation check 
The manipulation of divergent thinking was pretested with 38 (2 conditions x 19) 
participants, who reported their level of agreement with the following statements: “I am 
open to other points of view”; “If somebody disagrees with me, I listen to his opinion and 
think about it”; “I enjoy listening to new ideas”; “Usually I don’t try to get to know the 
deeper meaning of things” (reversed scored); and “I am not interested in divergent ideas” 
(reversed scored) (0 = not at all; 9 = extremely). All of the items were integrated into one 
scale of divergent thinking (α = .72). Participants in the divergent thinking group 
(M = 6.87, SD = 1.07) reported significantly more divergent thinking than subjects in the 
control group (M = 5.82, SD = 1.60), F(1, 36) = 5.69, p = .02, ² = .14. 
Confirmatory information processing 
A one-sample t-test against zero revealed that there was no evidence of confirmatory 
information processing in the control condition in which participants were primed with 
neutral concepts and had no mindset of divergent thinking (M = 0.08, SD = 0.76), 
t(27) = 0.57, p = .58. However, we found a significant disconfirmation bias when divergent 
 
                                                 
1 In addition, we asked some further questions not relevant to the aim of this study. 
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thinking and disorder were primed simultaneously (M = -0.31, SD = 0.69), t(26) = -2.35, 
p = .03. Levels of bias did not significantly differ from zero in the remaining four 
conditions (ts < 1.13, ps > .27).  
Our data revealed a significant interaction between divergent thinking and disorder 
priming, F(2, 158) = 3.59, p = .03, ² = .04. No main effects were observed (Fs < 1, 
ps > .58). Simple effects analyses were therefore carried out separately for the participants 
in the high and low divergent thinking groups. The nature of the interaction can be seen in 
Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Confirmation bias (combined) as a function of experimental condition in 
Study 2. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Simple effects analyses revealed that, in the high divergent thinking conditions, there were 
marginally significant differences between participants primed with disorder (M = -0.31, 
SD = 0.69), order (M = 0.22, SD = 1.11), and neutral concepts (M = 0.15, SD = 0.88), 
F(2, 158) = 3.01, p = .05, ² = .04. Post hoc tests indicated that high divergent thinking 
participants who were primed with disorder had a lower level of overall bias compared to 
high divergent participants primed with order (p = .02) or neutral concepts (p = .05). In 
contrast, no differences in confirmatory information processing were found between 
participants primed with disorder (M = 0.20, SD = 0.91), order (M = -0.16, SD = 0.91), or 
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neutral concepts (M = 0.08, SD = 0.76) in the low divergent thinking conditions, 
F(2, 158) = 1.12, p = .33, ² = .01. Cell means and standard deviations for the number of 
decision-consistent and decision-inconsistent pieces of information searched for (and for 
the confirmation bias) are shown in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2. Means and standard deviations for information search and combined z-
transformed confirmation bias (search and evaluation) as a function of experimental 
condition in Study 2. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
(combined) b 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
High disorder / High divergent 
thinking (n = 27) 
Low disorder / High divergent 
thinking (n = 29)  
Baseline / High divergent 
thinking (n = 27) 
High disorder / Low divergent 
thinking (n = 27) 
Low disorder / Low divergent 
thinking (n = 26) 
Baseline / Low divergent 
thinking (n = 28) 
2.67
 
3.45
 
3.00
 
3.59
 
2.88
 
3.25 
1.47
 
1.70
 
1.54
 
1.67
 
1.82
 
1.90 
 
2.78 
 
2.41 
 
2.56 
 
2.59 
 
2.62 
 
2.54 
1.31
 
1.74
 
1.93
 
1.45
 
1.75
 
1.67
 
-0.31 
 
0.22 
 
0.15 
 
0.20 
 
-0.16 
 
0.08 
0.69 
 
1.11 
 
0.88 
 
0.91 
 
0.83 
 
0.76 
Notes. a Six pieces of information were available in each category. b This ‘confirmation bias’ corresponds to 
the z-transformed combination of the information search bias and information evaluation biases. 
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Check for interfering effects 
We checked for possible interfering effects of gender and age by conducting a 3 (disorder: 
high vs. low vs. control) x 2 (divergent thinking: high vs. low) x 2 (gender: female vs. 
male) ANCOVA with age as covariate and confirmatory information processing as the 
dependent variable. We found a significant main effect for age, F(1, 151) = 11.66, 
p = .001, ² = .07, indicating that older participants exhibited stronger confirmatory 
information processing tendencies than younger participants, r(164) = .32, p < .001. 
However, the basic effect of disorder and divergent thinking on confirmatory information 
processing remained marginally significant when controlling for age, F(2, 157) = 2.39, 
p = .09, ² = .03. Participants’ gender did not significantly influence confirmatory 
information processing nor interact with the experimental conditions (Fs < 1.62, ps > .20).  
2.4.3 Discussion 
Overall, Study 2 indicates that it is not the mere activation of either disorder concepts or 
divergent thinking that produces an attenuating effect upon confirmatory information 
processing. Instead, it is the combination of both factors that leads to a preference for 
decision-inconsistent (disconfirmatory) information. When divergent thinking was 
promoted, participants who were primed with disorder not only tended to engage in lower 
levels of confirmatory information processing than individuals primed with orderly or 
neutral concepts, but also preferred decision-inconsistent information to decision-
consistent information. In contrast, disorder primes had no effect on confirmatory 
information search and evaluation when divergent thinking was not salient. 
It should be noted that, in Study 2, we did not find the basic effect of confirmatory 
information processing. However, recent research indicates that various manipulations can 
influence and reduce bias in information search and evaluation irrespective of the level of 
confirmatory information processing displayed by control groups (e.g., Jonas et al., 2003). 
Thus, we do not think that the lack of a significant confirmatory bias can account for our 
results. 
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2.5 General discussion 
2.5.1 Summary 
The present research shows that everyday environmental factors can influence 
confirmatory information processing. In particular, a messy and untidy environment (i.e., 
contextual disorder) can lower levels of biased information search and evaluation. In a 
disorderly environment, people take standpoint-inconsistent information into greater 
account than when making a decision in an orderly context. In Study 1, we found that 
participants who engaged in the experimental task in an untidy room exhibited less 
confirmatory information search and evaluation than participants did in a tidy room. 
Study 2 indicated that this effect is not simply due to the activation of disorder concepts, 
but predominantly occurs when participants additionally have a mindset of divergent 
thinking. Thus, Study 2 provided first evidence that divergent thinking plays a key role in 
influencing the relationship between contextual disorder and confirmatory information 
processing. In addition, our studies demonstrated that disorder not only reduces 
confirmatory information processing, but also makes participants prefer disconfirmatory 
arguments to confirmatory ones.  
2.5.2 Implications, limitations, and future research 
This research can be considered an extension of research on disorder effects and 
decision making. Vohs et al. (2013) argued that contextual disorder affects decisional 
outcomes, as it encourages individuals to seek out unconventional routes of decision 
making (see Vohs et al., 2013, Study 1). Our research provides additional evidence that 
environmental context plays a key role in decision making processes. Of particular 
importance is our finding that disorder makes individuals more open-minded toward 
decision-inconsistent information. These results could serve as an explanation for the 
finding of Vohs et al. (2013) that participants in a messy environment prefer 
unconventional choices to traditional (conventional) ones. It could be argued that 
traditional choices result from a preference for decision-consistent information, whereas 
unconventional choices may be due to individuals’ increased openness toward decision-
inconsistent information. Individuals are generally more familiar with traditional 
information than unconventional information, as they have been able to gain more 
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experience and familiarity with such long-established views. Because decision makers 
cannot evaluate information independently from their prior knowledge (which mainly 
consists of tradition-supporting information), information that is consistent with traditional 
views thus has a systematic evaluation advantage over unfamiliar, inconsistent 
information. As a result, information that supports traditional decisions may be 
systematically preferred over information that conflicts with them, which in turn bolsters 
traditional decisions. However, when individuals are stimulated to be open to new, 
unfamiliar information that is inconsistent with traditional views (e.g., through a disorderly 
environment), they should subsequently also be willing to consider new, unconventional 
routes of decision making (see also Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 1998). 
As far as decision quality is concerned, our results converge with those of Fischer et al. 
(2010), who argued that “if the decision maker is distracted from the decision context […] 
the integration of initial decision-consistent and inconsistent information should take place 
more efficiently, balanced, and even-handedly” (p. 880). That is, disordered (and thus 
distracting) environments can benefit decision making, as messiness can lead people to 
weigh the pros and cons of their decisions more carefully. Because decision-inconsistent 
information is considered more frequently when making a decision in a messy 
environment, decision quality is likely to be improved (see also Dijksterhuis, 2004). 
In line with Schwind et al. (2012), our results also indicate that divergent thinking plays 
a key role in balanced information processing. Schwind et al. (2012) obtained evidence 
that decision-inconsistent recommendations induce divergent thinking and subsequently 
balanced information search. Extending these findings, we showed that divergent thinking 
provides an ideal starting point for balanced information processing and impacts both 
information search and information evaluation.  
There are clear limitations to the current research. The present data supports the notion 
that the mental activation of disorder concepts per se does not reduce confirmatory 
information search and evaluation: In Study 2, divergent thinking was shown to be a 
prerequisite for the effect of contextual disorder on confirmatory information processing. 
That is, contextual disorder may have weakened biased information processing only 
because divergent thinking was promoted via the violation of our participants’ 
expectations. Stated differently, disorder primes should work best for balanced information 
processing if individuals’ openness toward diverging information is promoted in some way 
(e.g., by the violation of participants’ expectations) or in situations where individuals are 
open to different opinions (e.g., when a person has little prior knowledge of an issue). In 
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contrast, disorder should not promote balanced information processing when individuals 
have prior extreme attitudes toward an issue: If individuals hold rigid views, disorder 
primes may not be sufficient to prevent biased information processing.  
It would be highly beneficial for future research to investigate the psychological 
processes that underlie the effect of disorder on confirmatory information processing, as 
we did not find any indication that perceived tidiness or cognitive disorder (Study 1) 
mediated the effects of contextual disorder on confirmatory information processing. These 
processes may be located in an increased level of cognitive openness for the unexpected. 
That is, untidy environments may induce a sense of cognitive openness (for the new and 
unexpected, such as an extremely messy environment), which can lead to more systematic 
and less biased information processing. Thus, being surprised by an unexpectedly chaotic 
environment (in contrast to an expectedly chaotic environment) may lead participants to 
open up to unconventional and/or decision-inconsistent information. Thus, a fruitful 
endeavor for future studies might be to further clarify the role played by surprise within the 
disorder-to-information-processing effect. Other possible mechanistic explanations could 
be an increased need for cognition, an increase in tolerance, or a reduced decision focus in 
disorderly environments. 
In sum, the current research can be considered a starting point for exploring the effects 
of different attributes of external environments on decision making and confirmatory 
information processing. From a practical perspective, our research questions the ‘clean 
desk’ policy that is widely promoted in companies and offices. The present studies suggest 
that one should not strive toward tidiness in places where important decisions are made. 
Somewhat contrary to common sense, conference rooms – the places where most 
important decisions in economics and politics are made – should be messy in order to 
reduce confirmatory information processing and thus increase the likelihood of good, 
balanced decision making. 
 
3. Social randomness and decision making: The 
impact of low perceived control on confirmatory 
information processing2 
Social randomness and decision making 
3.1 Abstract 
The present research (Studies 3-6) investigated the potential impact of low perceived 
control on confirmatory information search and evaluation. We hypothesized that 
perceptions of having low control would increase confirmatory information search (a more 
motivational process) but would not affect confirmatory information evaluation (a more 
cognitive process). Four studies consistently supported this hypothesis. Furthermore, our 
findings revealed that perceiving oneself as having low control increases feelings of 
helplessness and that this is the underlying mechanism that leads to strengthened 
confirmatory information search. The present research also suggests a possible boundary 
condition for the proposed effect: serious, personal decision consequences.  
3.2 Background 
It is not uncommon for individuals to have to make important decisions under highly 
unpredictable – and thus uncontrollable – conditions. For example, a medical diagnosis 
may require individuals to choose between multiple treatment options; economic 
uncertainty may leave investing fraught with risk; and war might necessitate that 
politicians minimize human costs by utilizing only the most effective strategies. Given that 
individuals are naturally motivated to reduce feelings of uncertainty when faced with 
 
                                                 
2 A modified version of this research is currently submitted for publication together with Peter Fischer. 
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threats to their personal control over a situation (e.g., Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van 
Harreveld, 2012), confirmatory information search may be appealing to decision makers 
due to its potential ability to alleviate aversive states (e.g., Jonas, Graupmann, et al., 2006). 
However, confirmatory information search also carries severe negative implications, as 
individuals who engage in it may overlook the potential risks of their preferred decision 
outcome when they neglect decision-inconsistent information. Avoiding decision-
inconsistent information can impair decision quality and lead to severe decision failures 
(Janis, 1982; Kray & Galinsky, 2003). The question we pose in this research is thus 
whether individuals who perceive themselves as having low levels of control exhibit 
increased levels of confirmatory information search compared to individuals who feel that 
they possess high levels of control over their environment. 
3.2.1 Confirmatory information search and evaluation  
Research has consistently shown that individuals systematically prefer information that is 
consistent with their existing attitudes, standpoints, and decisions over information that is 
inconsistent with them (Frey, 1986; Jonas et al., 2001; Lundgren & Prislin, 1998). This 
confirmatory tendency has been found to occur during both information search and 
information evaluation. As far as decision making is concerned, confirmatory information 
search (a phenomenon that is also known as selective exposure; Frey, 1986) occurs when 
individuals seek out decision-consistent information while avoiding decision-inconsistent 
information. Similarly, confirmatory information evaluation (a phenomenon also called 
biased assimilation; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; for a recent review, see Fischer & Greitemeyer, 
2010; Hart et al., 2009) occurs when individuals assess information that is consistent with 
their decision as being of higher quality than decision-inconsistent information. 
These two phenomena can be explored using the classic selective exposure paradigm. In 
this paradigm, participants are required to choose between two different decision 
alternatives. For example, they may have to make a preliminary decision regarding 
whether or not a shop manager’s employment contract should be prolonged (e.g., Fischer, 
Greitemeyer, et al., 2008). Subsequently, each participant is given the opportunity to 
search for and evaluate additional pieces of information, which are either consistent or 
inconsistent with their prior decision. Once they finish this stage, participants make a final 
decision. While selective exposure is typically indicated by the presence of confirmation 
bias (i.e., the extent to which decision makers seek out more consistent than inconsistent 
pieces of information), biased assimilation is typically suggested by a visible evaluation 
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bias (i.e., the extent to which decision makers evaluate consistent information as being of 
higher quality than inconsistent information).  
Previous work on selective exposure has been carried out within both motivational and 
cognitive frameworks. One dominant motivational account for selective exposure is 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986). According to dissonance theory, making a 
decision causes individuals to become aware of the negative implications of their chosen 
alternative as well as the potential positive implications of the non-chosen alternative. This 
creates an aversive state of dissonance, which the individual may attempt to reduce by 
seeking out decision-consistent information and avoiding decision-inconsistent 
information. From this motivational perspective, consistent pieces of information are 
systematically preferred because they are more pleasant to process than inconsistent pieces 
of information, which exacerbate dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986; Jonas, 
Graupmann, et al., 2006; Kruglanski & Klar, 1987).  
A more cognitive perspective argues that the selective exposure effect is due to 
confirmatory information evaluation processes (Fischer et al., 2005; Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, 
et al., 2008). When making a decision, individuals attempt to find the qualitatively best 
pieces of information. However, they also evaluate information quality dependent on their 
own standpoint, so that standpoint-consistent information is typically assessed as having 
higher quality than standpoint-inconsistent information (Lord et al., 1979). As a result of 
such biased information evaluation processes, individuals systematically seek out 
consistent (i.e., ‘high-quality’) information while neglecting inconsistent (i.e., ‘low-
quality’) information (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 1998). In sum, this cognitive 
perspective assumes that biased assimilation is a precondition of selective exposure (see 
also Fischer et al., 2010; Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, et al., 2008). 
To date, various situational variables that strengthen confirmatory information search 
and evaluation have been identified. As predicted by motivational frameworks for studying 
selective exposure, factors that typically add to the aversive state of dissonance (e.g., 
negative mood; Jonas, Graupmann, et al., 2006) increase biased information search. In 
contrast – and in line with cognitive accounts of confirmatory information search – 
situational factors that touch upon cognitive processes (i.e., the differential assessment of 
decision-consistent and decision-inconsistent information) affect information evaluation, 
which can in turn have an impact on information search (e.g., Fischer et al., 2005; Fischer, 
Schulz-Hardt, et al., 2008). In the present research, we investigate both confirmatory 
information search and evaluation as a function of perceived control in order to 
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demonstrate that the proposed effect is more motivational (i.e., affects information search) 
than cognitive (i.e., affects information evaluation [and information search]) in nature. 
3.2.2 Control and confirmatory information search 
Personal control is generally referred to as an individual’s ability to manipulate some 
aspect of their environment (Schulz, 1976). The desire to pursue and maintain control over 
the environment is a fundamental human motivation (Kelley, 1971; Kelly, 1955; Seligman, 
1975; Skinner, 1995). While perceiving a sense of control positively affects one’s physical 
and psychological wellbeing (e.g., Langer & Rodin, 1976), the experience of having low 
control is aversive and anxiety-provoking (e.g., Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995). Thus, people 
are highly motivated to reassert a sense of control in situations where control deficiencies 
become salient (e.g., Brehm, 1966). However, when individuals are unable to regain a 
sense of control objectively, they adopt alternative strategies to compensate for it (Kay et 
al., 2008; cf. Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). For example, Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008) showed that a threat to personal control significantly increased illusory pattern 
perception or “the identification of a coherent and meaningful interrelationship among a set 
of random or unrelated stimuli” (p. 115). According to Kay et al. (2009), such 
compensatory control strategies buffer against the aversive state of low control, as they 
affirm individuals’ beliefs in an orderly and predictable world.  
Recent research has shown that compensatory control strategies can be based on 
external or personal sources (for an overview, see Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, & Nash, 
2010). When drawing from external sources of compensatory control, individuals may rely 
on either controlling agents (e.g., religious deities) or non-agentic sources that provide a 
sense of order (e.g., human progress, scientific theories; Kay et al., 2008; Rutjens, van der 
Pligt, et al., 2010; Rutjens, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2010). Most relevant to the 
present research, individuals can also defend themselves against feelings of having low 
levels of control by means of personal sources of compensatory control such as epistemic 
personal control. 
Epistemic personal control refers to a tendency for people to bolster their personal 
confidence in the truth of their personal views when they experience decreased levels of 
control (Kay, Gaucher, et al., 2010). For example, McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, and Spencer 
(2001, Study 1) found that a threat to personal certainty caused individuals to 
spontaneously exaggerate their convictions regarding issues that were unrelated to the 
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threat manipulation. This finding suggests that individuals might insulate themselves from 
distressing thoughts caused by perceiving themselves as having little control over a 
situation by strengthening their senses of certainty in other domains (see also McGregor & 
Jordan, 2007; McGregor & Marigold, 2003; McGregor, Nail, Marigold, & Kang, 2005). 
In a very similar vein, previous studies on selective exposure have shown that 
confirmatory information search is an effective means of increasing confidence in one’s 
standpoints and decisions (for an overview, see Hart et al., 2009). Thus, the present 
research focuses on confirmatory information search as a potential source of epistemic 
personal control. We propose that when individuals perceive themselves as having low 
levels of control over a situation, they may attempt to compensate for it by bolstering their 
confidence in a prior decision and do so by systematically preferring decision-consistent 
information over decision-inconsistent information.  
Recent evidence for this assumption comes from studies showing that various motives 
to increase confidence trigger confirmatory information search. For example, Hart, Adams, 
Burton, Shreves, and Hamilton (2012) demonstrated that the trait ‘need for cognitive 
closure’ (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Kruglanski, 1990; Webster & Kruglanski, 
1994), an epistemic motivational factor that can be defined as the “desire for a definite 
answer on some topic, any answer as opposed to confusion and ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 
1989, p.13), is positively related to the search for decision-consistent information. In 
addition, Sawicki and colleagues have argued that confirmatory information search 
(particularly for unfamiliar information) bolsters one’s attitude and thus reduces attitude 
uncertainty (Sawicki et al., 2011) and attitude ambivalence (Sawicki et al., 2013). 
Similarly, individuals who are highly confident in their attitudes typically exhibit 
decreased levels of selective exposure (Albarracín & Mitchell, 2004; for an overview, see 
Hart et al., 2009). Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that threatening events, which 
are typically associated with high levels of uncertainty (e.g., terrorist threat), increase 
confirmatory information search (Fischer, Kastenmüller, et al., 2011, Studies 3-5; Frey & 
Stahlberg, 1986; Jonas et al., 2003; Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005). 
In sum, recent research indicates that confirmatory information search may function as a 
means of strengthening confidence in one’s decisions and thus as a source of epistemic 
personal control. However, previous research did not directly investigate the impact of low 
control on confirmatory information search. The present research aims to close this gap. 
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3.2.3 The present research 
The present research aimed to investigate whether an experimental induction of low 
control would strengthen individuals’ preferences for decision-consistent over decision-
inconsistent information following a decision and to test whether this effect could be traced 
back to processes of epistemic personal control. Since epistemic personal control can be 
considered a key motivational drive that arises when an individual’s sense of control is 
threatened, we expected the proposed effect to be more motivational (i.e., affects 
information search) than cognitive (i.e., affects information evaluation [and information 
search]) in nature.  
However, it must be noted that a threat to personal control may also affect confirmatory 
information search, as it could impair cognitive processing. One could argue that 
perceiving a threat to personal control restrains cognitive capacities, in turn triggering 
heuristic information processing. Importantly, such cognitive heuristics are usually 
associated with confirmatory information processing (Chaiken, 1980, 1987). In other 
words, increased levels of confirmatory information search following a threat to personal 
control might not necessarily be due to the motivational drive of epistemic personal 
control, but could instead result from biases in information evaluation that originate in 
heuristic information processing. Thus, from a cognitive perspective, both confirmatory 
information evaluation and confirmatory information search should be affected by a 
mindset of heuristic information processing following a threat to personal control. 
However, since we expected the proposed effect to be more motivational (i.e., resulting 
from the desire to restore perceived control by means of epistemic personal control) than 
cognitive (i.e., resulting from reduced cognitive capacities) in nature, we hypothesized that 
perceptions of low vs. high control would differentially affect selective exposure, but 
would not influence biased assimilation (Studies 3-6).  
Concretely, we tested whether low perceived control increases confirmatory 
information search in Study 3. In Study 4, we tried to rule out the possible alternative 
explanation that a general feeling of threat (as opposed to the specific experience of having 
low levels of control) might drive the proposed effect. In Study 5, we investigated whether 
a heightened need for cognitive closure could account for the effect of low perceived 
control on confirmatory information search. In Study 6, we addressed a specific boundary 
condition (i.e., serious personal consequences of a decision) and tried to shed more light on 
whether participants’ increased feelings of helplessness underlie the proposed effect. 
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3.3 Study 3 
In this study, we hypothesized that perceptions of low control would increase confirmatory 
information search, but would not affect information evaluation. More specifically, we 
predicted that participants who experienced having low levels of control would show 
higher levels of confirmatory information search than participants who experienced high 
control. 
3.3.1 Method 
Participants and design 
Sixty-four participants were recruited near the campus of the University of Regensburg. 
Two subjects with missing data and six subjects who revised their preliminary decision at 
the end of the experiment were excluded from the dataset, which left a final sample of 56 
participants (28 female and 28 male, age ranged from 19 to 77 years; M = 28.71, 
SD = 13.60). The experiment was based on a one-factorial design with two between-
subjects conditions (control: low vs. high). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the experimental conditions.  
Material and procedure 
Upon their arrival, participants were informed that they would be taking part in two 
unrelated studies. The first study was a recall task (actually the experiment’s control 
manipulation) and the second study was a questionnaire concerning personnel decisions 
(the decision case). Utilizing a procedure from Whitson and Galinsky (2008), we 
manipulated perceived control by asking participants to recall a personal experience. 
Participants in the low control condition received the following instructions: “Please recall 
a particular incident in which you did not have any control over the situation. Please 
describe the situation in which you felt a complete lack of control over the situation – what 
happened, how you felt, etc.” Participants in the high control condition received identical 
instructions, except that they were asked to think about an incident in which they were in 
complete control of the situation (see Whitson & Galinsky, 2008, Study 3). 
Subsequently, participants worked on a fictitious decision scenario that dealt with the 
case of Mr. Miller, who was the manager of a fashion store (e.g., Fischer, Greitemeyer, et 
al., 2008; Frey, 1986). They were told that Mr. Miller had run the store for one year to 
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mixed effect and then received some background information about him (which was 
balanced with regard to its positive and negative aspects). Participants were then asked to 
decide whether or not Mr. Miller’s contract should be extended. Upon making their 
preliminary decision, participants had the opportunity to consider additional information 
regarding the decision problem. This information consisted of 12 one-page comments 
written by Mr. Miller’s colleagues, each of which has been summarized in a 2-3 sentence 
thesis. Participants received an overview sheet that included the main thesis of each 
comment. These statements made it clear whether the colleague voted for or against the 
extension of Mr. Miller’s contract. An example of a favorable statement was: “Mr. Miller 
shows intuition and sensitivity for new trends and developments in the fashion industry. 
His creative ideas might facilitate entering new sales markets. Therefore, his contract 
should be extended.” A critical opinion was: “Mr. Miller has just copied competitors’ 
business ideas. Thus, his business strategy has doubtful prospects of success. Therefore, his 
contract should not be extended.”  
In sum, six statements supported and six statements rejected the contract’s extension, 
meaning that participants received equal amounts of decision-consistent and decision-
inconsistent information. Participants were asked to indicate which pieces of information 
they would like to read in more detail after the experiment being free to select as many as 
they wanted (0-12 pieces of information). We subtracted the number of pieces of decision-
inconsistent information selected from the number of pieces of decision-consistent 
information selected and used this difference as a dependent variable (confirmation bias; 
Frey, 1986). In addition, participants assessed the expected quality of all of the pieces of 
information according to their credibility (“How credible do you expect this information to 
be?”; 0 = not at all, 10 = extremely) and importance (“How important will this information 
be for making a good decision?”; 0 = not at all, 10 = extremely). Since the credibility and 
importance assessments were highly correlated (α = .91), they were integrated into a single 
scale of information evaluation. The evaluation bias was calculated as the difference 
between the average evaluated quality of decision-consistent and decision-inconsistent 
pieces of information. After participants finished the information search and evaluation 
tasks, they made a final decision.3 Participants were then fully debriefed. 
 
                                                 
3 In both this and the subsequent studies within this chapter, we asked some additional questions for 
exploratory purposes. However, because they were not relevant to the aim of this research, they are not 
reported here. 
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3.3.2 Results 
Confirmatory information search 
We checked for the typical effect of confirmatory information search (i.e., the preference 
for decision-consistent information over decision-inconsistent information) using one-
sample t-tests against zero. In the low control condition, no significant confirmation bias 
occurred (M = -0.23, SD = 1.45), t(29) = -0.88, p = .39. In the high control condition, we 
found a significant disconfirmation bias (i.e., the preference for inconsistent over 
consistent information) (M = -1.12, SD = 1.48), t(25) = -3.85, p = .001. 
When testing the specific hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA (control: low vs. high) with 
confirmatory information search as the dependent variable revealed that participants in the 
low control condition exhibited weaker tendencies toward disconfirmatory information 
processing (M = -0.23, SD = 1.45) than participants in the high control condition 
(M = ‑1.12, SD = 1.48), F(1, 54) = 5.04, p = .03, η2 = .09. Cell means and standard 
deviations for the number of decision-consistent and decision-inconsistent pieces of 
information searched for (and for the confirmation bias) are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1. Means and standard deviations for information search and confirmation bias as a 
function of experimental condition in Study 3. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low control (n = 30)  
High control (n = 26) 
2.00 
2.19 
1.72 
1.55 
 
2.23 
3.31 
1.61
1.54
 
-0.23 
-1.12 
1.45 
1.48 
Notes. a Six statements were available in each category. 
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Confirmatory information evaluation 
One sample t-tests against zero revealed that both experimental groups showed a 
significant evaluation bias (ts > 3.88, ps < .001). 
More importantly, a one-way ANOVA (control: low vs. high) with confirmatory 
information evaluation as the dependent variable revealed no significant difference 
between the low control group (M = 1.39, SD = 1.96) and the high control group 
(M = 1.35, SD = 1.54), F(1, 54) = 0.01, p = .94. Cell means and standard deviations for the 
decision-consistent and decision-inconsistent pieces of information evaluated (and for the 
evaluation bias) are presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Means and standard deviations for information evaluation and evaluation bias as 
a function of experimental condition in Study 3. 
 Information evaluation    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Evaluation bias 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low control (n = 30)  
High control (n = 26) 
6.58 
6.70 
1.38 
1.11 
 
5.19 
5.35 
1.25
1.08
 
1.39 
1.35 
1.96 
1.54 
Notes. a Six statements were available in each category. 
 
Check for interfering effects 
We checked for interfering effects of gender and age by conducting a 2 (control: low vs. 
high) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) ANCOVA with age as a covariate and confirmatory 
information search as the dependent variable. However, we found neither a significant 
main effect nor any significant interactions for these checking variables (Fs < 0.13, 
ps > .71). Thus, our findings were not related to the participants’ gender or age. 
3.3.3 Discussion 
Study 3 provided initial evidence that levels of perceived control affect decision-relevant 
information search. Participants who wrote about an event in which they had experienced 
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low control exhibited lower levels of disconfirmatory information search (i.e., more 
selectivity) than participants who wrote about an event in which they had felt in complete 
control. As expected, information evaluation did not differ as a function of perceived 
control. In sum, the results support the hypothesis that perceiving oneself as having a low 
level of control may motivate individuals to restore perceptions of order in other life 
domains by means of a more confirmatory information search.  
However, it might not have been the perception of low control per se that weakened 
disconfirmatory information search. One could also argue, for example, that recalling a 
low-control situation induced feelings of threat, and that this threat might reduce 
disconfirmatory information search (i.e., increase selectivity). This explanation is in line 
with research showing that people exhibit increased levels of confirmatory information 
search when they are subjected to a threatening event (e.g., Jonas et al., 2003). We 
conducted Study 4 to provide evidence that it is the specific experience of low control – 
and not threat in general – that drives the effect of low control on selective exposure. 
3.4 Study 4 
Study 4 had two aims: to replicate the findings of Study 3 and to test whether threat might 
be an alternative explanation for these findings. We hypothesized that it would not be a 
feeling of general threat that drives the proposed effect, but rather the perceptions of low 
control that often go hand in hand with threatening events. Therefore, we provided 
participants with a threatening scenario in either a low control context or a high control 
context and then presented them with a decision case. We predicted that participants in the 
low control condition would exhibit higher levels of confirmatory information search than 
participants in the high control condition. Similar to Study 3, the control manipulation was 
not expected to differently affect confirmatory information evaluation.  
3.4.1 Method  
Participants and design 
Forty individuals (27 female and 13 male, age ranged from 19 to 40 years; M = 23.05, 
SD = 3.92) participated in this experiment, which was based on a one-factorial design with 
two between-subjects conditions (control: low vs. high).  
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Material and procedure 
As in Study 3, participants were informed that they would participate in two completely 
unrelated studies. In both conditions, participants recalled a personal experience that was 
threatening. Participants in the low control condition received the following instruction: 
“Please recall a particular incident in which something threatening happened to you and 
you did not have any control over the situation. Please describe the situation in which you 
were threatened and felt a complete lack of control over the situation – what happened, 
how you felt, etc.” By contrast, participants in the high control condition were told: “Please 
recall a particular incident in which something threatening happened to you and you were 
in complete control of the situation. Please describe the situation in which you were 
threatened but you felt complete control over the situation – what happened, how you felt, 
etc.” (see Whitson & Galinsky, 2008, Study 4). 
Study 4 utilized the same decision scenario as Study 3 (the Mr. Miller decision case). 
As in Study 3, we collapsed assessments of information credibility and importance into a 
scale of information evaluation (α = .95) and calculated confirmation bias and evaluation 
bias as indicators of confirmatory information search and evaluation. After making a final 
decision, participants were fully debriefed. 
3.4.2 Results 
Manipulation check  
Following previous research (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), two independent raters who 
were blind to the conditions coded each situation in accordance with the criterion “How 
much did the participant experience or feel threat in the situation?” (1 = very little, 7 = very 
much). Inter-rater agreement was acceptable (α = .73), so we collapsed the two sets of 
ratings into a single score of expressed threat. The experimental conditions did not differ 
with regard to the extent of threat expressed, F(1, 36) = 1.48, p = .23. The two raters also 
coded each situation for control by answering the question “How much did the person 
experience or feel control in the situation?” (1 = very little, 7 = very much). We averaged 
the coders’ ratings (α = .88) to yield a single score of expressed control. In the low control 
condition, participants expressed significantly lower levels of control (M = 1.84, 
SD = 0.69) than participants in the high control condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.18), 
F(1, 36) = 69.35, p < .001, η2 = .66. Thus, the manipulation was successful. 
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Confirmatory information search 
As far as the basic effect of confirmatory information search is concerned, we found a 
significant confirmation bias only in the low control condition (M = 0.95, SD = 1.70), 
t(19) = 2.50, p = .02. In contrast, no confirmation bias occurred in the high control 
condition (M = -0.15, SD = 0.67), t(19) = -1.00, p = .33.  
In accordance with our hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA (control: low vs. high) with 
confirmatory information search as the dependent variable indicated that participants who 
experienced low control showed significantly increased levels of confirmatory information 
search (M = 0.95, SD = 1.70) compared to participants who experienced high control 
(M = -0.15, SD = 0.67), F(1, 38) = 7.24, p = .01, η2 = .16. For an overview, see Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Means and standard deviations for information search and confirmation bias as a 
function of experimental condition in Study 4. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low control (n = 20) 
High control (n = 20)  
3.90 
3.65 
1.69 
1.69 
 
2.95 
3.80 
1.19
1.82
 
0.95 
-0.15 
1.70 
0.67 
Notes. a Six statements were available in each category. 
 
Confirmatory information evaluation 
One sample t-tests against zero revealed a significant evaluation bias for the low control 
group (M = 1.10, SD = 2.05), t(19) = 2.41, p = .03, while no significant evaluation bias 
occurred in the high control group (M = 0.22, SD = 1.04), t(19) = 0.95, p = .35. 
However, we found no significant differences in confirmatory information evaluation 
between the low control (M = 1.10, SD = 2.05) and the high control (M = 0.22, SD = 1.04) 
conditions, F(1, 38) = 2.95, p = .09. For an overview, see Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4. Means and standard deviations for information evaluation and evaluation bias as 
a function of experimental condition in Study 4. 
 Information evaluation    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Evaluation bias 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low control (n = 20)  
High control (n = 20) 
6.74 
5.67 
1.26 
1.10 
 
5.64 
5.45 
1.46
1.15
 
1.10 
0.22 
2.05 
1.04 
Notes. a Six statements were available in each category. 
 
Check for interfering effects 
We checked for interfering effects of gender and age by conducting a 2 (control: low vs. 
high) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) ANCOVA with age as a covariate and confirmatory 
information search as the dependent variable. No significant main effect or interactions 
occurred for these checking variables (Fs < 1.09, ps > .30). These results suggest that our 
findings were not related to the participants’ gender or age. 
3.4.3 Discussion 
Once again, our results indicated that individuals who experience low control exhibit 
greater tendencies toward confirmatory information search than individuals who 
experience high control. In addition, Study 4 ruled out the possibility that a general feeling 
of threat might underlie this basic effect. Though participants in both conditions recalled a 
threatening situation, those who experienced low control proved more likely to select 
consistent over inconsistent information. Thus, an increased feeling of general threat is 
unlikely to account for differences in confirmatory information search following a control 
manipulation.  
However, there is another possible alternative explanation, which needs to be addressed. 
From a lay epistemic point of view (lay epistemic theory; Kruglanski, 1989, 1990; 
Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983) experimentally induced feelings of low control might have 
strengthened participants’ needs for cognitive closure (i.e., the desire for a firm answer to 
an ambiguous situation; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) and could have thereby increased 
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confirmatory information search. This assumption is in line with Whitson and Galinsky 
(2008, Study 1), who showed that control motivation promotes participants’ personal needs 
for structure (i.e., the desire for cognitive simplicity and structure; Neuberg & Newsom, 
1993), which is strongly related to the need for cognitive closure (Clow & Esses, 2005; 
Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997; Neuberg, West, Judice, & Thompson, 1997). In addition, 
Hart et al. (2012) provided evidence that the trait ‘need for closure’ is positively associated 
with selective exposure to information. Thus, it seems plausible that recalling a low control 
situation could have strengthened participants’ needs for cognitive closure, and that this 
might have subsequently increased confirmatory information search. We addressed this 
alternative explanation in Study 5. 
3.5 Study 5  
In Study 5, we used a more direct manipulation of perceived control. Furthermore, we also 
employed a more realistic decision scenario to ensure that our previous findings were not 
due to either a specific manipulation or a specific decision context. In addition, we tested 
the potential mediating role of participants’ needs for cognitive closure. 
3.5.1 Method  
Participants and design  
Fifty students from the University of Regensburg volunteered to participate in this study. 
Three subjects were excluded, either because they revised their preliminary decision (2) or 
demonstrated suspicion (1). Thus, analyses were conducted using data from 47 participants 
(28 female and 19 male, age ranged from 18 to 54 years; M = 23.66, SD = 6.89). The 
experiment was based on a one-factorial design with two between-subjects conditions 
(control: low vs. high).  
Material and procedure  
As in the previous studies, participants were informed that they would be completing two 
unrelated studies. The first study was a concept identification task (the control 
manipulation) and the second study was a questionnaire on treatments for disc herniation 
(the decision case). The concept identification task (Pittman & Pittman, 1979; Whitson & 
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Galinsky, 2008) was conducted on a computer. Participants were first given the following 
information: “This is a concept identification task. The computer will select a concept, and 
– through the feedback the computer provides – it is your job to determine what this 
concept is. You will be presented with pairs of symbols, each containing complementary 
values of five dimensions. In each pair of symbols, one correctly represents the concept the 
computer has selected, and one incorrectly represents the concept. It is your job to decide 
which side of the screen displays the correct symbol. Each time you select a symbol, the 
computer will tell you if you are correct or incorrect and present you with another pair. 
You will be exposed to ten pairs in total. You should learn the correct answer from the 
computer’s feedback and choose correctly as often as possible. First, you will participate in 
a practice trial with ten pairs of symbols (just like the real trials). This is to give you a 
chance to get used to the task.” (see Whitson & Galinsky, 2008, Study 1). 
In addition to the written command, the researcher orally reiterated the instruction on 
the basis of a sample pair of symbols to make sure that participants fully understood the 
task. Following the practice block, participants completed the actual task, which consisted 
of another four blocks (each with 10 pairs of figures). After each block, participants 
indicated what they considered to be the correct concept for the block, but they did not 
receive feedback regarding their response. In the low control condition, participants 
received random feedback following each pair of figures – half of the time the computer 
indicated that they had responded correctly, and half of the time it denoted their responses 
as being incorrect. We ensured that the last pair of symbols was always followed by 
feedback claiming the participant was incorrect. Since the feedback was non-contingent to 
participants’ responses, subjects were unable to correctly identify a concept. In the high 
control condition, participants completed the task without receiving any computer 
feedback. Participants were told that without feedback, it was impossible to learn the 
correct value, and they were asked to simply make their best guess regarding the concept 
the computer had selected. We emphasized that performance did not matter, and that the 
task was all about intuitive answers. After finishing the concept identification task, 
participants indicated the extent to which they felt they lacked control during the task 
(“Even when I tried, I was unable to get my way in this task”; 1 = strongly disagree, 
6 = strongly agree). In addition, we measured participants’ needs for cognitive closure 
with a German short scale (Schlink & Walther, 2007) that consisted of 16 items (e.g., “I 
don’t like unpredictable situations”; 1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). 
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In the second part of the experiment, we used a medical decision case that presented 
two alternative treatments for disc herniation (i.e., surgical treatment vs. non-surgical 
treatment). Participants were informed that this decision case was part of a medical study 
concerning the public acceptance of different treatments for disc herniation. After reading 
some background information on the condition and the two treatments (which was 
balanced with regard to its positive and negative aspects), participants were asked to make 
a preliminary decision between the surgical and non-surgical therapies for treating disc 
herniation. 
Next, participants were given the opportunity to consider additional information on the 
topic. This information consisted of 12 one-page extracts from medical journals and 
scholarly literature on disc herniation. Participants received a list that contained the main 
thesis of each extract (1-2 sentences). Of the 12 pieces of information, six favored surgical 
treatments and six rejected them. As a result, six statements were consistent with each 
participant’s preliminary choice, and six statements were inconsistent with it. An example 
of a statement favoring surgery was: “After surgery, patients can fully participate in leisure 
activities because their spine regains flexibility and resilience within a short period of 
time.” A statement opposing surgery was: “After surgery, scar tissue can increase pressure 
on the nerve inside the vertebral canal, which can cause severe pain.” Participants 
indicated whether they would like to read the corresponding extract later on and rated the 
quality of each statement (credibility and importance; 0 = not at all, 10 = extremely). We 
integrated assessments of credibility and importance into a single scale of information 
evaluation (α = .79) and calculated confirmation bias and evaluation bias as indicators of 
selective exposure and biased assimilation.  
Following information search and evaluation, participants made a final decision and 
answered a number of questions that addressed potential confounding variables. These 
variables were ‘acute and chronic pain’, ‘prior knowledge of disc herniation’, ‘personal 
involvement in disc herniation’, and the ‘involvement of significant others in disc 
herniation’. Participants were then fully debriefed and dismissed. 
3.5.2 Results 
Manipulation check  
Participants in the low control condition reported a significantly higher lack of control 
(M = 4.12, SD = 1.48) than participants in the high control condition (M = 2.96, 
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SD = 2.06), F(1, 45) = 5.03, p = .03, η2 = .10. Thus, the control manipulation was 
successful.  
Confirmatory information search  
Participants in the low control condition exhibited a significant preference for decision-
consistent rather than decision-inconsistent pieces of information (M = 1.00, SD = 1.82), 
t(23) = 2.70, p = .01. However, we found no significant confirmation bias in the high 
control condition (M = -0.09, SD = 1.88), t(22) = -0.22, p = .83. 
More importantly, participants who experienced low control exhibited marginally 
increased tendencies of confirmatory information search (M = 1.00, SD = 1.82) compared 
to participants in the high control condition (M = -0.09, SD = 1.88), F(1, 45) = 4.06, 
p = .05, η2 = .08. For an overview, see Table 3.5. 
In addition, participants who experienced low control indicated a marginally higher 
need for cognitive closure (M = 3.48, SD = 0.75) than participants in the high control 
condition (M = 3.11, SD = 0.68), F(1, 45) = 3.23, p = .08, η2 = .07. We subsequently tested 
whether the effect of low control on confirmatory information search was mediated by 
differences in the need for cognitive closure. A bootstrapping analysis (1,000 bootstrap 
samples; Preacher & Hayes, 2004) revealed that this was not the case. The true indirect 
effect was estimated to lie between -.10 and +.77 with 95% confidence. Since zero is in the 
confidence interval, we cannot conclude that the real indirect effect became significant at 
p < .05. Thus, differences in need for cognitive closure do not appear to mediate the effect 
of low control on confirmatory information search.  
Table 3.5. Means and standard deviations for information search and confirmation bias as a 
function of experimental condition in Study 5. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low control (n = 24)  
High control (n = 23) 
4.63 
4.39 
1.53 
1.27 
 
3.63 
4.48 
1.31
1.34
 
1.00 
-0.09 
1.82 
1.88 
Notes. a Six statements were available in each category.  
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Confirmatory information evaluation 
The low control group showed a significant evaluation bias (M = 1.36, SD = 1.63), 
t(23) = 2.70, p < .001, whereas the high control group exhibited no significant evaluation 
bias (M = 0.85, SD = 2.28), t(22) = 1.79, p = .09.  
In accordance with our hypothesis, we found no significant differences between the low 
control (M = 1.36, SD = 1.63) and high control (M = 0.85, SD = 2.28) conditions regarding 
confirmatory information evaluation, F(1, 45) = 0.79, p = .38. For an overview, see 
Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6. Means and standard deviations for information evaluation and evaluation bias as 
a function of experimental condition in Study 5. 
 Information evaluation    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Evaluation bias 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low control (n = 24)  
High control (n = 23) 
7.36 
7.06 
1.16 
1.65 
 
6.00 
6.21 
1.14
1.18
 
1.36 
0.85 
1.63 
2.28 
Notes. a Six statements were available in each category. 
 
Check for interfering effects 
We checked for potential interfering effects of gender and age by conducting a 2 (control: 
low vs. high) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) ANCOVA with age as a covariate and 
confirmatory information search as the dependent variable. No significant main effects or 
interactions with the control manipulation occurred for gender or age (Fs < 0.73, ps > .40). 
In addition, we found no significant effects for the covariates ‘acute and chronic pain’, 
‘prior knowledge of disc herniation’, ‘personal involvement in disc herniation’, and 
‘involvement of significant others in disc herniation’ (Fs < 1.57, ps > .21). Thus, these 
variables have not systematically affected our findings. 
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3.5.3 Discussion 
Like the previous studies, Study 5 showed that experiences of low control strengthen 
confirmatory information search (but not confirmatory information evaluation). As far as 
participants’ needs for cognitive closure are concerned, we found no indications that 
differences in the need for cognitive closure might underlie the effect of low control on 
confirmatory information search.  
Now that we have ruled out possible alternative explanations of our basic effect, we 
attempt to shed more light on the psychological process underlying it. We hypothesize that 
confirmatory information search serves as a means of compensatory control, and that 
selective exposure may help bolster individuals’ decision confidence by affirming their 
perceptions of order and predictability when faced with low control situations. As reported 
by Kay, Gaucher, et al. (2010), “compensatory control appears to be specifically mediated 
by a kind of negative affect related to anxious uncertainty” (p. 43). Against this theoretical 
background, we hypothesized that the negative affective experience of low control (i.e., a 
feeling of helplessness) would mediate the effect of low control on confirmatory 
information search. Study 6 thus tested whether it is an increased feeling of helplessness 
that underlies our basic effect.  
In the previous studies, we consistently found that perceptions of low control strengthen 
selective exposure, which points to an epistemic personal control function of confirmatory 
information search. However, in specific decision contexts, it might be more functional to 
engage in balanced information search in order to regain a sense of order and predictability 
(Pittman & D’Agostino, 1989). One such potential boundary condition could lie in 
decisions that imply serious personal consequences for the decision maker (e.g., a risk to 
personal health). Such decisions may lead to an increased fear of failure (and thus a fear of 
losing even more control) in individuals who experience low control (see also Fischer, 
Kastenmüller, et al., 2011). Consequently, individuals who perceive a threat to their 
personal control should be highly motivated to avoid the aversive consequences of a wrong 
decision and should therefore exhibit increased efforts to make the right choice when the 
personal consequences of a decision are high. As a result of this heightened accuracy 
motivation, individuals who experience low control should be more cautious – and thus 
more balanced – in their search for decision-relevant information (Chaiken et al., 1989; 
Ditto et al., 1998; Hart et al., 2009). Study 6 addresses this potential boundary condition 
for the effect of low control on confirmatory information search.  
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3.6 Study 6 
Study 6 was designed to (a) investigate the psychological process underlying the effect of 
low control on confirmatory information search and to (b) test a potential boundary 
condition for this effect. We hypothesized that differences in participants’ feelings of 
helplessness would mediate the basic effect of low control on confirmatory information 
search. We also expected that low control would only increase confirmatory information 
search when the personal consequences of the decision were low. To experimentally test 
this assumption, we introduced two versions of a single decision case, which differed only 
in the seriousness of the personal consequences they implied (consequences: low vs. high). 
We also opted to incorporate a baseline condition (void of any manipulation of control) to 
further emphasize that the differences between the experimental groups in the previous 
studies were driven by perceptions of low control (control: low vs. high vs. baseline).  
3.6.1 Method  
Participants and design 
One hundred and fifty-one participants were recruited near the campus of the University of 
Regensburg. Fifteen subjects were excluded from the dataset due to missing data (3), 
suspicion (1), or revising their preliminary decision (11). This left a final sample of 136 
participants (75 female and 61 male, age ranged from 18 to 62 years; M = 24.92, 
SD = 6.99). The experiment was based on a 3 (control: low vs. high vs. baseline) x 
2 (consequences: low vs. high) between-subjects design. 
Material and procedure 
Participants were told that they would be completing two unrelated tasks. Similar to 
Studies 3 and 4, we manipulated control by using the Whitson and Galinsky’s recall task 
(2008, Study 3) and then asked participants to indicate the extent to which they felt 
helpless (“How helpless do you feel currently?”; 1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). In the no-
manipulation baseline condition, participants instead recalled their last visit to a 
supermarket. In order to manipulate perceived personal consequences, we created two 
versions of the same decision case, which differed only in regard to the implied seriousness 
of the final decision’s personal consequences. Utilizing the disc herniation decision case 
from Study 5, we informed all of the participants that the questionnaire was part of a 
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medical study. They then received identical background information on disc herniation and 
on the two treatments (i.e., surgical vs. non-surgical treatment).  
In the low consequences condition, participants were given instructions identical to 
those in Study 5 and were told that the questionnaire was a survey on the public acceptance 
of different treatments for disc herniation. They were then asked whether they favored 
surgical or non-surgical treatments. In contrast, in the high consequences condition, 
participants were asked to imagine that they suffered from a disc herniation themselves and 
should decide which of the two treatments they wanted to start. We checked for the 
consequences manipulation by asking participants the following question: “How serious do 
you think the consequences of your decision will be?” (0 = not serious at all, 
10 = extremely serious).  
All participants were then informed that additional information on the decision problem 
was available. These pieces of information were either consistent or inconsistent with the 
participants’ preliminary decision and were presented in statements of 1-2 sentences (see 
Study 5). Participants rated the credibility and importance of all statements (0 = not at all, 
10 = extremely) and indicated whether they would like to read the corresponding text in 
detail. The assessments of credibility and importance were collapsed into a single scale of 
information evaluation (α = .87). As in the previous studies, the confirmation bias and the 
evaluation bias served as dependent variables. After making their final decision and 
answering some questions on potential confounding variables (‘acute and chronic pain’, 
‘prior knowledge of disc herniation’, ‘personal involvement in disc herniation’, and the 
‘involvement of significant others in disc herniation’), participants were fully debriefed.4 
  
 
                                                 
4 In Study 6, we also measured positive and negative affect with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to ensure that differences in positive or negative affect did not 
mediate the effect of low control on selective exposure. Mediation analysis using a bootstrapping method 
(1,000 bootstrap samples; Preacher & Hayes, 2004) did not reveal any reliable indirect effect of low control 
on confirmatory information search for positive affect [-.13, .45] or negative affect [-.25, .22] when outcome 
relevance was low (95%-CI). These results are consistent with research showing that perceptions of low 
control do not affect mood (Kay et al., 2008; Rutjens, van Harreveld, et al., 2010). 
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3.6.2 Results 
Manipulation check  
Participants in the high consequences condition rated the consequences of the decision case 
as being significantly more serious (M = 7.01, SD = 2.28) than participants in the low 
consequences condition (M = 5.62, SD = 2.68), F(1, 134) = 10.73, p = .001, η2 = .07. Thus, 
the manipulation of perceived consequences was successful. 
Confirmatory information search 
Separate t-tests against zero were conducted for all of the experimental conditions in order 
to check for the typical effect of confirmatory information search. A significant 
confirmation bias only occurred for low control subjects in the low consequences condition 
(M = 1.39, SD = 1.50), t(22) = 4.45, p < .001. In the remaining five experimental 
conditions, we found no confirmation bias that significantly differed from zero 
(ts < │1.45│, ps > .16). 
To check the specific hypotheses, we ran a 3 (control: low vs. high vs. baseline) x 
2 (consequences: low vs. high) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between the control manipulation and the manipulation of 
consequences, F(2, 130) = 3.87, p = .02, η2 = .06. No main effects were observed 
(Fs < 2.12, ps > .14). The nature of the interaction can be seen in Figure 3.1. 
Simple effects analyses were conducted to clarify this interaction. In the low 
consequences conditions, we found marginally significant differences in confirmatory 
information search between the low control group (M = 1.39, SD = 1.50), the high control 
group (M = 0.45, SD = 1.47), and the baseline group (M = 0.17, SD = 1.67), 
F(2, 130) = 2.73, p = .07, η2 = .04. Post hoc tests indicated that when consequences were 
low, participants who had recalled an event in which they experienced little control 
exhibited (marginally) higher tendencies toward confirmatory information search 
compared to either individuals who had thought about a situation where they had 
experienced a high level of control (p = .09) or individuals who had thought about their last 
visit to a supermarket (p = .03). However, in the high consequences conditions, there were 
no significant differences in confirmatory information search between the low control 
(M = -0.32, SD = 2.01), high control (M = 0.61, SD = 2.21), and baseline conditions 
(M = 0.35, SD = 2.08), F(2, 130) = 1.50, p = .23. For an overview, see Table 3.7. 
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Figure 3.1. Confirmation bias as a function of experimental condition in Study 6. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
As far as the psychological process underlying our basic effect is concerned, we found 
significant differences in participants’ reported levels of helplessness between the low 
control group (M = 1.61, SD = 1.10), the high control group (M = 1.25, SD = 0.53), and the 
baseline group (M = 1.15, SD = 0.36), F(2, 131) = 4.89, p = .01, η2 = .07. More 
specifically, simple effects analyses showed that participants in the low control condition 
felt more helpless than either participants in the high control condition (p = .02) or 
participants in the baseline condition (p = .003). 
We thus tested whether the effect of low control (coded as a binary variable, 
0 = baseline/high control and 1 = low control) on selective exposure was mediated by 
differences in participants’ helplessness. To test this hypothesis, a bootstrapping analysis 
based on 1,000 bootstrap samples was conducted (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). This analysis 
yielded a significant direct effect of low control on confirmatory information search 
(t = 2.73, p = .008), which was reduced to marginal significance (t = 1.84, p = .07) when 
controlling for the mediator ‘helplessness’. In addition, the true indirect effect was 
estimated to lie between +.02 and +.71 with 95% confidence. Because zero is not in the 
confidence interval, we can conclude that the real indirect effect became significant with 
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p < .05. Thus, it appears that differences in individuals’ feelings of helplessness mediate 
the effect of low control on confirmatory information search. 
Table 3.7. Means and standard deviations for information search and confirmation bias as a 
function of experimental condition in Study 6. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low control / Low 
consequences (n = 23) 
High control / Low 
consequences (n = 22) 
Baseline / Low 
consequences (n = 23) 
Low control / High 
consequences (n = 22) 
High control / High 
consequences (n = 23) 
Baseline / High  
consequences (n = 23) 
4.61
 
4.64
 
4.35
 
4.09
 
4.22
 
4.35 
0.99
 
1.18
 
1.70
 
1.51
 
1.54
 
1.72 
 
3.22 
 
4.18 
 
4.17 
 
4.00 
 
3.61 
 
4.00 
1.54
 
1.47
 
1.59
 
1.14
 
1.47
 
1.86
 
1.39 
 
0.45 
 
0.17 
 
-0.32 
 
0.61 
 
0.35 
1.50 
 
1.47 
 
1.67 
 
2.01 
 
2.21 
 
2.08 
Notes.a Six statements were available in each category. 
 
Confirmatory information evaluation 
Separate t-tests against zero were conducted for all of the experimental conditions to check 
for the typical effect of confirmatory information evaluation. With regard to low decision 
consequences, we found a significant evaluation bias when participants perceived low 
control (M = 1.78, SD = 1.89), t(23) = 4.51, p < .001, and high control (M = 1.34, 
SD = 2.35), t(22) = 2.68, p = .01. However, no significant evaluation bias occurred in the 
baseline condition (M = 0.94, SD = 2.68), t(23) = 1.68, p = .11. For the high consequences 
conditions, we did not find a significant evaluation bias for the low control group 
(M = 0.13, SD = 2.45), t(22) = 0.24, p = .81. However, the high control group (M = 0.94, 
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SD = 2.19) and the baseline group (M = 0.93, SD = 2.10) exhibited confirmatory 
information evaluation tendencies that differed marginally from zero (ts > 2.05, ps = .05). 
We also ran a 3 (control: low vs. high vs. baseline) x 2 (consequences: low vs. high) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). In accordance with our hypotheses, the analysis revealed 
no significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 3.06, ps > .08). For an overview, see 
Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8. Means and standard deviations for information evaluation and evaluation bias as 
a function of experimental condition in Study 6. 
 Information evaluation    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Evaluation bias 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Low control / Low 
consequences (n = 23) 
High control / Low 
consequences (n = 22) 
Baseline / Low  
consequences (n = 23) 
Low control / High 
consequences (n = 22) 
High control / High 
consequences (n = 23) 
Baseline/ High  
consequences (n = 23) 
6.95
 
7.27
 
7.29
 
6.20
 
6.66
 
7.12 
1.44
 
1.23
 
1.76
 
1.63
 
1.71
 
1.38 
 
5.17 
 
5.93 
 
6.35 
 
6.07 
 
5.72 
 
6.18 
1.94
 
1.68
 
1.73
 
1.66
 
1.48
 
2.08
 
1.78 
 
1.34 
 
0.94 
 
0.13 
 
0.94 
 
0.93 
1.89 
 
2.35 
 
2.68 
 
2.45 
 
2.19 
 
2.10 
Notes. a Six statements were available in each category. 
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Check for interfering effects 
We checked for the potential interfering effects of gender and age by conducting a 
3 (control: low vs. high vs. baseline) x 2 (consequences: low vs. high) x 2 (gender: female 
vs. male) ANCOVA with age as a covariate and confirmatory information search as the 
dependent variable. No significant main effects or interactions were found for gender or 
age (Fs < 2.13, ps > .14). We also found no significant effects for the covariates ‘acute and 
chronic pain’, ‘prior knowledge of disc herniation’, ‘personal involvement in disc 
herniation’, and ‘involvement of significant others in disc herniation’ (Fs < 2.41, ps > .12). 
3.6.3 Discussion 
In summary, Study 6 showed that individuals who were experimentally induced to 
experience low control did not exhibit increased levels of confirmatory information search 
in a decision case that implied serious personal consequences for the decision maker. 
Instead, experiencing low control strengthened confirmatory information search only when 
the personal consequences of the decision were low. This effect was mediated by 
differences in participants’ helplessness: Individuals who perceived low control indicated 
higher levels of helplessness (compared to individuals in the high control and baseline 
conditions), which in turn increased confirmatory information search.  
3.7 General discussion 
3.7.1 Summary 
Across four studies, we found consistent support for our hypothesis that perceptions of low 
control increase confirmatory information search. In particular, individuals who 
experienced low control showed increased tendencies toward confirmatory information 
search compared to individuals who perceived high control. In contrast to the effect of low 
control on confirmatory information search, we found no evidence that confirmatory 
information evaluation was affected by the manipulation of control. Additionally, we ruled 
out alternative explanations for the effect of low control on selective exposure based on 
either an increased perception of general threat (Study 4) or a heightened need for 
cognitive closure (Study 5), which could have resulted from the induction of low control. 
In Study 6, we demonstrated that individuals who had recalled a low control event 
experienced increased levels of helplessness, which then strengthened confirmatory 
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information search. In addition, we established a boundary condition on the current 
findings: Perceptions of low control did not affect confirmatory information search in a 
decision scenario that implied serious personal consequences for the decision maker. 
3.7.2 Implications, limitations, and future research 
A clear limitation of the current research is that we did not find the basic effect of 
confirmatory information search (or else found disconfirmatory information search 
tendencies; see Study 3). This seems to conflict with previous studies on selective 
exposure, which have provided evidence that control groups usually display a confirmation 
bias. However, recent research has found that various manipulations can affect 
confirmatory information search relatively irrespective of whether or not control groups 
exhibit significant confirmatory information search tendencies (Jonas et al., 2003). Thus, 
this limitation is unlikely to affect the main finding of the present research. In addition, it 
should be noted that the mediation test in Study 6 was based on a correlational analysis. 
For this reason, we cannot definitely determine the causal direction of the mediation effect.  
The theoretical implications of the current research are threefold. First, our findings 
provide evidence that the effect of low control on selective exposure is more likely 
motivational than cognitive in nature. People who experience low control tend to select 
information in a more confirmatory way, but they do not show increased tendencies of 
confirmatory information evaluation compared to individuals who experience high control. 
If this basic effect were due to changes in cognitive processing, perceptions of low control 
would be expected to affect both information evaluation and information search. This is 
because perceiving a threat to personal control impairs cognitive functioning and thus 
promotes heuristic information processing. In turn, heuristic information processing can 
trigger biases in information evaluation and thus strengthen confirmatory information 
search (Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 1998). However, since we 
did not find that low control affected confirmatory information evaluation, our results 
suggest that a motivational process may drive the effect of low control on confirmatory 
information search. Our findings are in line with the dominant motivational account of 
selective exposure – namely, dissonance theory. According to dissonance theory, factors 
that add to post-decisional dissonance increase selective exposure. Against this theoretical 
background, our results suggest that the aversive experience of low control might 
strengthen negative feelings of dissonance and subsequently increase an individual’s 
motivation to reduce these feelings by means of confirmatory information search.  
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Second, our studies support and extend the research of Jonas, Graupmann, et al. (2006), 
who argued for a mood-regulating function of selective exposure. Jonas, Graupmann, et al. 
(2006) provided empirical evidence that confirmatory information search serves not only 
as a means of dissonance reduction, but can also attenuate negative mood. Our studies can 
be considered a first hint that selective exposure may not solely serve to regulate general 
negative affect (Jonas, Graupmann, et al., 2006), but might also bring relief to individuals 
who suffer from the specific feelings of low control and situational unpredictability.  
Third, the present studies complement previous research that has investigated 
compensatory control processes (for an overview, see Kay, Gaucher, et al., 2010). Our 
findings provide an important extension to this research, as they demonstrate that selective 
exposure might also function as a compensatory control mechanism that alleviates the 
aversive state of low control by affirming perceptions of order. In particular, we found that 
it is the affective experience of low control (i.e., a feeling of helplessness) that drives its 
effect on confirmatory information search. This mediation effect is in line with Kay, 
Gaucher, et al. (2010), who argued that processes of compensatory control should be 
mediated by such negative affective reactions. Thus, our findings suggest that increased 
levels of confirmatory information search might help people to re-establish a sense of order 
and predictability when they experience low control. More specifically, selective exposure 
might serve as an epistemic personal control strategy (see Kay, Gaucher, et al., 2010) that 
allows people to create a confirmatory reality and thus to dispel uncertainty. Although our 
work offers first evidence for a key role played by selective exposure in epistemic personal 
control, further research is needed to more closely examine the links between control, 
(un)certainty, and selective exposure. 
On a more practical level, our results have important implications for decision making 
under uncontrollable conditions. Previous research has often connected selective exposure 
with poor decision outcomes (e.g., Janis, 1982; Kray & Galinsky, 2003), as it leads to the 
maintenance of suboptimal or even incorrect decisions (Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 
2003). Severe decision failures can thus result from confirmatory information search. 
However, researchers have also underlined benefits of selective exposure, such as 
preventing indecisiveness (Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984; Wicklund & Frey, 1981). In other 
words, selective exposure “protects the current intention (or tentative decision) from being 
replaced by competing behavioral tendencies” (Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984, p. 224) and thus 
helps individuals to “deduce a course of action” (Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984, p. 225). In sum, 
our findings indicate that individuals who experience low control exhibit increased levels 
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of selective exposure, and that these increases might promote their capacity to act, but at 
the potential cost of suboptimal decision making. From an evolutionary perspective, this 
effect seems to be highly functional for individuals who face uncontrollable events (e.g., 
existential threats). We would, for example, expect that a person who is persecuted by an 
aggressor should quickly arrive at a final choice when deciding whether to flee in one 
direction or the other (even if there might be one suboptimal alternative) as opposed to 
standing still at the crossroads while carefully weighing all of the pros and cons of both 
options. Similarly, recent research has shown that experiencing low levels of control drives 
cognitive processes (e.g., analytical thinking) that facilitate effective action (Zhou, He, 
Yang, Lao, & Baumeister, 2012). 
Does the action-promoting quality of selective exposure imply that de-biasing 
techniques are unneeded when decision makers face uncontrollable events? Although 
selective exposure seems to be highly adaptive in real threat situations that require fast 
decision making, there are various low control decision contexts in which confirmatory 
information search may be rather dysfunctional. In the present research, we showed that 
not only the direct experience of low control (Study 5) but also the mere salience of a low-
control situation (Studies 3, 4, 6) can increase selective exposure. This implies that even 
non-acute threats to personal control (e.g., media coverage of economic threats) may 
strengthen confirmatory information search in everyday decision making (e.g., investment 
decisions), and potentially lead to decision failures. Thus, when facing non-acute threats to 
personal control, it seems reasonable to counteract selectivity by means of de-biasing 
techniques. One such de-biasing technique could lie in reminding oneself of the supposed 
consequences that come along with the decision (see Study 6). Future research is needed to 
further investigate the effectiveness of de-biasing techniques in low-control decision 
making.  
Another question arising from our findings is whether individuals’ perceptions of low 
control might have played some role in previous research on threat and selective exposure. 
Recently, various threats have been found to increase selective exposure (Fischer, 
Kastenmüller, et al., 2011, Studies 3-5; Lavine et al., 2005). However, these studies have 
so far neglected potential differences in participants’ perceived control. Based on our 
findings, one might suggest that threat only increases selective exposure when people 
perceive low control (see Study 4). Thus, future research should investigate whether the 
relationship between threat and selective exposure is moderated by levels of experienced 
control (see also Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey, & Jones, 2013). In conclusion, the current 
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research extends our knowledge of the effects of low control on decision making and 
confirmatory information search and evaluation. Our findings suggest that decision makers 
who experience low control tend to bolster their confidence in a decision by engaging in 
confirmatory information search. Although this phenomenon seems to be highly functional 
in low control situations that demand quick decisions, it also implies the risk of low-quality 
decision making. 
 
4. Metaphysical randomness and decision making: 
The impact of religious priming on confirmatory 
information processing5 
Metaphysical randomness and decision making 
4.1 Abstract 
The present research (Studies 7-11) investigated the impact of religious priming on 
confirmatory information processing, which is a tendency to prefer standpoint-consistent 
information to standpoint-inconsistent information in information search and evaluation. It 
was consistently found that religious priming reduces confirmatory information processing 
in secular decision scenarios. Alternative explanations based on psychological discomfort 
processes (Study 8) or the activation of mortality or fairness concepts were ruled out 
(Study 9). We also found that reminders of religion guided individuals’ thoughts away 
from secular decisions and toward religious ideas, leading to decreased tendencies of 
confirmatory information processing (Studies 10 and 11). 
4.2 Background 
Religious beliefs are often thought to be linked with closed-mindedness. Consistent with 
this perception, researchers have observed that holding such beliefs is positively related to 
the intolerance of ambiguity (Duriez, 2003; Sagioglou & Forstmann, 2013) as well as the 
outright neglect of information that is inconsistent with them (Hart et al., 2009). This 
 
                                                 
5 A modified version of this research is currently submitted for publication together with Peter Fischer. 
Metaphysical randomness and decision making 69 
neglect may have significant real-world consequences. For example, Moore and Kraemer 
(2005) report that parents and administrators who believe in creationism “have become 
increasingly active in pressuring biology teachers to avoid evolution” (p. 463) in school 
lessons.  
However, recent research has also indicated that the association between religious belief 
and closed-mindedness may not be so simple. Believers have been found to be open to new 
information in multiple respects (Neyrinck, Vansteenkiste, Lens, Duriez, & Hutsebaut, 
2006) and have the ability to live with inconsistencies (Assor, Cohen-Malayev, Kaplan, & 
Friedman, 2005). These studies are a first suggestion that it is not religiosity or religious 
concepts per se that facilitate closed-mindedness – instead, religious convictions may 
actually promote open-mindedness toward standpoint-inconsistent information, with the 
provision that this information does not conflict with the religious beliefs. 
The question we pose in this chapter is thus whether religion makes individuals more 
open to information that is inconsistent with their initial standpoints when making secular 
decisions. In five experimental studies, we test whether religious salience attenuates 
confirmatory information processing. 
4.2.1 Confirmatory information processing 
In relation to decision making, confirmatory information processing refers to a tendency 
for individuals to systematically prefer decision-consistent information over decision-
inconsistent information in both information search (a phenomenon called selective 
exposure; Frey, 1986) and information evaluation (a phenomenon called biased 
assimilation; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; for a recent review, see also Fischer & Greitemeyer, 
2010; Hart et al., 2009). Although confirmatory information processing may have some 
important functional aspects (such as preventing indecisiveness; Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984), 
research has mainly focused on its negative implications for decision making. This is 
because confirmatory information processing is strongly associated with poor decision 
outcomes, by dissuading or counteracting the revision of incorrect decisions (Greitemeyer 
& Schulz-Hardt, 2003). Given the potential ramifications of poor decision making (e.g., in 
a political or business context), it is of great importance to investigate those factors and 
psychological processes that may make individuals more open – and thus less confirmatory 
– in information processing. 
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In the standard research paradigm for examining confirmatory information processing, 
participants work on a decision problem that requires them to make a preliminary decision 
by choosing one of two alternatives (e.g., whether the contract of a manager should be 
extended or not; Fischer, Greitemeyer, et al., 2008). Afterwards, participants are given the 
opportunity to search for and/or evaluate additional information that either supports or 
opposes their initial decision. Confirmatory information processing may be observed in 
information search if participants systematically search for decision-consistent information 
and/or neglect decision-inconsistent information (e.g., Jonas et al., 2001). In information 
evaluation, it may be observed if participants assess information that is consistent with 
their decision as being of higher quality than decision-inconsistent information 
(Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003).  
These effects of confirmatory information processing can be explained by considering 
either motivational or cognitive perspectives. One major motivational framework is 
dissonance theory, which suggests that confirmatory information processing is a means of 
reducing post-decisional dissonance. According to this perspective, individuals experience 
cognitive dissonance – an adverse and undesirable motivational state – after making 
decisions, as both the positive aspects of the non-chosen alternative and the negative 
aspects of the chosen alternative become salient. To reduce the unpleasantness and 
discomfort of dissonance, individuals systematically prefer decision-consistent information 
over decision-inconsistent information (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986).  
A more cognitive point of view argues that biases in information processing can be 
explained by any given individual’s inability to be truly objective when making decisions. 
Even if individuals strive to find the qualitatively best pieces of information to aid them in 
decision making, they cannot evaluate information quality independently of their own 
standpoints and subsequently tend to ascribe greater quality to decision-consistent 
information than decision-inconsistent information (Lord et al., 1979). As a result, 
decision-consistent information is systematically preferred over decision-inconsistent 
information (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Ditto et al., 1998). Building on this theoretical 
foundation, previous research has shown that confirmatory information search and 
confirmatory information evaluation are strongly interconnected (Fischer, Greitemeyer, et 
al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2005), and both phenomena have been recently subsumed under 
the term confirmatory information processing. In the present research we investigate 
confirmatory information processing as a function of religious salience. 
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4.2.2 Religion and confirmatory information processing 
Religion can be defined as “cognition, affect, and behavior that arise from the awareness 
of, or perceived interaction with, supernatural entities that are presumed to play an 
important role in human affairs” (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009, p. 71). Although 
conventional wisdom has held that religion will steadily lose its ground in society, it still 
plays an important role in peoples’ lives, as religious traditions strongly influence the 
cultural contexts humans live in (Hommel & Colzato, 2010). For example, religion might 
affect individuals via their exposure to religious ideas and imagery (e.g., religious 
terminology in advertisements or in popular music).  
Initial evidence for the assumption that religion decreases confirmatory information 
processing has been found in studies that investigated believers’ personalities. Individuals 
who pursue certain types of religiosity have been shown to share characteristics that are 
associated with balanced information processing. According to Saroglou (2002b), open and 
mature religiosity and spirituality is associated with high openness to experience – a 
general appreciation of unusual and new ideas – and greater variety in personal experience 
(McCrae, 1996). Similarly, spirituality-emotional religion goes hand in hand with low 
decisiveness and low closed-mindedness (Saroglou, 2002a). Thus, individuals who believe 
in spirituality-emotional religion feel only a limited need to “striv[e] for closure in 
judgment and decision making” (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1050) and do not mind 
when “their knowledge is confronted by alternative opinions or inconsistent evidence” 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1050). 
Further evidence for the assumption that religion may attenuate confirmatory 
information processing comes from a line of research indicating that faith in God serves as 
a “source of compensatory control” (Kay, Gaucher, et al., 2010, p. 37) when individuals 
have to deal with aversive circumstances (see also Kay et al., 2008, 2009). In particular, 
Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh, and Nash (2009, Study 2) showed that belief in God 
“minimizes the experience of error” (p. 385). The researchers demonstrated that high 
degrees of religiosity are associated with smaller increases in error-related negativity 
(ERN). Error-related negativity is an event-related potential, which is generated in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) after individuals have made a mistake. Importantly, 
Inzlicht and Tullett (2010) demonstrated that religious primes lead to decreases in event-
related negativity (ERN) for believers and thus determined the direction of causality for 
this effect. Inzlicht et al. (2009) concluded that religion serves as a buffer against the 
experience of conflict, as it fosters “a type of thinking that constrains thought and 
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perception away from inconsistencies” (p. 385). These results suggest that reminders of 
religion might help individuals to deal with inner conflicts. 
Importantly for the present research, Baumeister, Bauer, and Lloyd (2010) have argued 
that religion may have favorable effects on decision making. When making a decision, 
individuals often have to choose between two or more options, with some arguments 
favoring one alternative and additional ones supporting the other(s). Upon making a 
decision, individuals often have to face conflicts, as decision-inconsistent information (i.e., 
arguments that support the non-chosen options) becomes salient. Such conflicts have 
aversive implications such as uncertainty and post-decisional dissonance, which 
individuals are usually motivated to avoid. According to Baumeister et al. (2010) “religion 
may appeal [in these decision making situations] because of its potential to alleviate the 
emotional burden that stems from the plethora of choices” (p. 75). This is because it 
“prescribes certain actions” (p. 73), and can therefore provide “a sense of moral certainty” 
(p. 75) of having made the right choice (i.e., a choice that is in line with religious 
prescriptions).  
Building upon this research, we hypothesize that religion might not only help 
individuals to manage conflicts by providing guidelines for which option to choose, but 
may also be beneficial in helping individuals deal with the conflicts that arise when 
standpoint-inconsistent information becomes salient following a decision. One prominent 
way to reduce such conflicts is by engaging in confirmatory information processing. Thus, 
we hypothesize that if religion helps people to deal with inconsistencies and discrepancies 
following a decision, it should also decrease an individual’s tendency to neglect decision-
inconsistent information, subsequently reducing confirmatory information processing.  
4.2.3 The present research 
In the present research, we expected individuals to exhibit decreased tendencies of 
confirmatory information processing when religious concepts are salient. As religion 
provides a means for dealing with the experience of conflict (Inzlicht et al., 2009; Inzlicht 
& Tullett, 2010), we suggested that reminders of religion might help individuals to stay 
open to information that is inconsistent with their decisions. More specifically, a state of 
religious salience should lead inconsistent information to be searched for more frequently 
and evaluated more positively because reminders of religion draw participants’ foci away 
from post-decisional conflicts. In five studies, we experimentally tested whether religious 
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priming reduces confirmatory information processing and investigated the potential 
underlying psychological processes. 
4.3 Study 7 
In Study 7, we hypothesized that reminders of religion would reduce confirmatory 
information processing. We predicted that participants who thought about religion would 
exhibit lower levels of confirmatory information search and evaluation in a secular 
decision making scenario than participants who recalled an event unrelated to religion. 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants and design 
Sixty-eight students participated in this experiment, which was based on a one-factorial 
design with two experimental between-subjects conditions (prime: religious vs. non-
religious). Two subjects with obvious systematic response tendencies and three subjects 
who revised their preliminary decision were excluded from the dataset, which left a final 
sample of 63 participants (43 female and 20 male, age ranged from 17 to 57 years; 
M = 23.35, SD = 5.50). 
Materials and procedure 
Subjects were randomly assigned to either a religious prime or a non-religious prime 
control condition. The priming procedure was similar to the type of manipulation that has 
been successfully used to induce mortality salience (see Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Participants in the religious prime condition were asked to 
write down the first thing that came to their minds when thinking about religion. In the 
control condition, subjects wrote about their last visit to a supermarket. 
Following the manipulation, participants completed a fictitious decision case regarding 
whether or not the contract of a manager (Mr. Miller) should be extended (Fischer et al., 
2005; Frey, 1986). After reading some background information about Mr. Miller (which 
was balanced with regard to positive and negative aspects), participants made a 
preliminary decision by indicating whether they favored or opposed the extension of Mr. 
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Miller’s contract. They were then informed that additional information about the decision 
case was available. This information was written by Mr. Miller’s colleagues and included 
12 one-page comments. Participants received a list that included the main thesis of each 
one-page comment summarized in 2-3 sentences. These summaries made it clear whether 
or not the colleague supported extending Mr. Miller’s contract. An example of a favorable 
comment was: “Mr. Miller shows intuition and sensitivity for new trends and 
developments in the fashion industry. His creative ideas might facilitate entering new sales 
markets. Therefore, his contract should be extended.” An example of a critical comment 
was: “Mr. Miller has just copied competitors’ business ideas. Thus, his business strategy 
has doubtful prospects of success. Therefore, his contract should not be extended.” There 
were six comments favoring the extension and six comments opposing it, ensuring that, 
regardless of each participant’s preliminary decision, half of the comments were consistent 
with it and half inconsistent with it. Participants evaluated the expected quality of all of the 
comments according to their credibility (“How credible do you expect this information to 
be?”; 0 = not at all, 10 = extremely) and importance (“How important will this information 
be for making a good decision?”; 0 = not at all, 10 = extremely). They also indicated 
whether they would like to read the corresponding comments in detail later on. Participants 
could select freely from the available comments. We computed difference values for 
information credibility, information importance, and information search by subtracting the 
corresponding values for decision-inconsistent information from the values for decision-
consistent information. For the following analyses, the three difference scores were 
transformed into z-values and collapsed into an overall index of confirmatory information 
processing (α = .90).  
After the participants finished the information search and evaluation, they made a final 
decision as to whether Mr. Miller’s contract should be extended.6 Participants were then 
fully debriefed and told that there were no extended versions of the articles. 
  
 
                                                 
6 In both this and the subsequent studies within this chapter, we asked some further questions, which were not 
relevant to the aim of this research.  
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4.3.2 Results 
Confirmatory information processing 
We checked for the typical effect of confirmatory information processing (i.e., the 
preference of decision-consistent information over decision-inconsistent information) 
using one-sample t-tests against zero. The results showed no basic effect of confirmatory 
information processing for the control condition (M = 0.22, SD = 0.87), t(32) = 1.43, 
p = .16. In contrast, we found a marginally significant disconfirmatory bias (i.e., a 
preference for decision-inconsistent information over decision-consistent information) 
when religious concepts were salient (M = -0.29, SD = 0.86), t(29) = -1.86, p = .07. 
A one-way ANOVA (prime: religious vs. non-religious) with confirmatory information 
processing as the dependent variable revealed that participants in the religious prime 
condition exhibited stronger disconfirmatory information processing tendencies 
(M = ‑0.29, SD = 0.86) than participants in the control condition (M = 0.22, SD = 0.87), 
F(1, 61) = 4.06, p = .02, ² = .08.7 For an overview of the results, see Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Means and standard deviations for information search and combined z-
transformed confirmation bias (search and evaluation) as a function of experimental 
condition in Study 7. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
(combined) b 
Prime M SD  M SD  M SD 
Religious (n = 30) 
Non-religious (n = 33)  
3.73 
4.45 
1.76 
1.20 
 
2.73 
2.76 
1.82
1.35
 
-0.29 
0.22 
0.86 
0.87 
Notes. a Six pieces of information were available in each category. b This ‘confirmation bias’ corresponds to 
the z-transformed combination of the information search bias and information evaluation biases. 
 
                                                 
7 Recent research has shown that religious primes foster prosocial decision making (e.g., Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2007). Thus, we also tested whether activating religious concepts affected participants’ initial 
decisions in the present studies. However, we found no statistically significant effects (ps > .19). 
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Check for interfering effects 
We checked for interfering effects of gender and age by conducting a 2 (prime: religious 
vs. non-religious) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) ANCOVA with age as a covariate and 
confirmatory information processing as the dependent variable. We found a significant 
main effect for age, F(1, 58) = 7.89, p = .007, ² = .12, indicating that older participants 
exhibited stronger confirmatory information processing tendencies than younger 
participants, r(63) = .38, p = .002. However, the basic effect of religious priming on 
confirmatory information processing remained marginally significant when controlling for 
age, F(1, 58) = 3.84, p = .05, ² = .06. Gender did not significantly influence confirmatory 
information processing, nor interact with the prime manipulation (Fs < 2.34, ps > .13). 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Overall, Study 7 provided initial evidence for our hypothesis that religious salience 
attenuates confirmatory information processing. Participants who thought about religion 
exhibited stronger disconfirmatory tendencies in information processing than participants 
who concentrated on a non-religious topic, preferring decision-inconsistent over decision-
consistent information when reminded of God.  
However, Study 7 had significant limitations. First, neither information regarding 
religious affiliation nor information regarding religiosity was collected. It is therefore 
unclear whether our results were affected by such variables. Second, the highly fictitious 
decision case we employed means that we cannot conclude with certainty that religious 
salience decreases confirmatory information processing in decision contexts where the 
participants feel more involved. To address these shortcomings, we sought to control for 
religious affiliation and the strength of personal religiosity in Study 8. We also used an 
alternative manipulation and a decision scenario that we felt would elicit greater personal 
involvement.  
A potential explanation for our findings that religious primes attenuate confirmatory 
information processing could be that religious primes lead to decreases in cognitive 
dissonance. High levels of such dissonance (which arises after making decisions) have 
been shown to trigger confirmatory information processing (Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986). 
Reminders of religion might buffer this unpleasant state; for example, previous studies 
have demonstrated that religion leads to subjective wellbeing (e.g., Hackney & Sanders, 
2003) and provides relief from emotionally aversive conditions such as death anxiety (e.g., 
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Jonas & Fischer, 2006; Vail et al., 2010). We addressed this possible explanation in 
Study 8.  
4.4 Study 8 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants and design 
Seventy-two undergraduate students participated in this study. Three subjects were 
excluded from the dataset because of systematic response tendencies (1), suspicion (1), or 
the revision of their preliminary decision (1). The final sample consisted of 69 participants 
(50 female and 19 male, age ranged from 19 to 29 years; M = 23.12, SD = 1.91). 92.8% of 
the subjects indicated identification with a religious affiliation (76.8% Catholicism, 13% 
Evangelism, 2.9% other denominations). The experiment was based on a one-factorial 
design with two experimental between-subjects conditions (prime: religious vs. non-
religious). 
Materials and procedure 
We employed a priming task similar to the one used by Gervais and Norenzayan (2012). 
The task required participants to evaluate thirteen different adjectives (e.g., accepting 
controlling) on differing criteria. Participants in the religious prime condition indicated 
how well each adjective describes God (1 = not at all, 9 = very well), whereas participants 
in the non-religious prime control condition rated how frequently the adjectives are used in 
everyday speech (1 = not at all, 9 = very often). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two conditions. 
Participants were then asked to work on a decision case regarding the holdings of the 
Regensburg University library, namely, whether its traditional paper books should be 
converted to – and replaced by – eBooks. It was assumed that participants’ status as 
students at the University would lead them to feel high levels of involvement with this 
decision case. Furthermore, participants were told that there were ongoing debates 
regarding whether digital books should gradually replace bound books in the University 
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library. Having been presented with the background information, participants made a 
preliminary decision as to whether or not the paper books should be converted to eBooks. 
Afterwards, participants completed an eleven-item affect questionnaire (Elliot & 
Devine, 1994) in which they indicated their levels of positive affect, negative self-directed 
affect, and psychological discomfort on 11-point Likert scales (0 = does not apply at all, 
10 = applies very much). We collapsed the affect items into three affect indices: the 
positive affect index (happy, good, friendly, optimistic; α = .85); the negative self-directed 
affect index (angry toward myself, dissatisfied with myself, guilty, self-critical; α = .85); 
and the index of psychological discomfort (uncomfortable, uneasy, bothered; α = .91).  
On completing the affect measure, participants were given the opportunity to consider 
additional information relating to the decision case. This information consisted of 12 one-
page comments written by experts in new media and learning. Participants received a list 
that presented the key points of each comment in a brief summary (1-2 sentences). Of the 
twelve comments, six supported the conversion to eBooks and six arguments opposed it. 
An example of an argument supporting the conversion to eBooks was: “The production of 
bound books requires an enormous amount of paper. Therefore, eBooks are less 
environmentally damaging than paper books.” An example of an argument opposing the 
conversion was: “Paper books provide a better overview of the text, so you can navigate 
faster within the document. Therefore, reading paper books is much more convenient than 
reading eBooks.” Subjects rated the quality (credibility and importance) of each statement 
(0 = not at all, 10 = extremely) and indicated whether they would like to read the 
corresponding article later on. We computed difference values for information credibility, 
information importance, and information search by subtracting the corresponding values 
for decision-inconsistent information from the values for decision-consistent information. 
For the following analyses, the three difference values were transformed into z-values and 
integrated into an overall index of confirmatory information processing (α = .71). After 
completing the information search and evaluation, participants indicated their final 
decision. 
Next, participants filled out the German translation of the Religious Orientation Scale 
(Allport & Ross, 1967; Zwingmann, Hellmeister, & Ochsmann, 1994). This scale was 
formulated to measure extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientation. Extrinsic religiosity is 
described as being a means to an end or as using religion to achieve secular goals. In 
contrast, intrinsic religiosity is internally motivated and an end in itself. Each religiosity 
concept was measured with six items. The extrinsic scale (α = .70) contains items such as 
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“A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial social 
activity” (1 = not at all true, 9 = exactly true), whereas an example of an item in the 
intrinsic scale (α = .85) is “I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in 
life” (1 = not at all true, 9 = exactly true). Afterwards, participants were fully debriefed 
and informed that there were no extended versions of the articles.  
4.4.2 Results 
Confirmatory information processing 
We checked for the typical effect of confirmatory information processing with one-sample 
t-tests against zero. The results indicated a marginally significant confirmatory bias in the 
non-religious prime control group (M = 0.23, SD = 0.67), t(33) = 1.97, p = .06, and a 
marginally significant disconfirmatory bias in the religious prime group (M = -0.26, 
SD = 0.83), t(34) = -1.83, p = .08. 
In accordance with our hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA (prime: religious vs. non-
religious) with confirmatory information processing as the dependent variable indicated 
that participants in the religious prime condition exhibited significantly weaker 
confirmatory information processing tendencies (M = -0.26, SD = 0.83) than participants in 
the control condition (M = 0.23, SD = 0.67), F(1, 67) = 7.03, p = .01, ² = .10. For an 
overview of the results, see Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2. Means and standard deviations for information search and combined z-
transformed confirmation bias (search and evaluation) as a function of experimental 
condition in Study 8. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
(combined) b 
Prime M SD  M SD  M SD 
Religious (n = 35) 
Non-religious (n = 34)  
2.11 
3.12 
1.28 
1.85 
 
2.69 
2.79 
1.43
1.70
 
-0.26 
0.23 
0.83 
0.67 
Notes. a Six pieces of information were available in each category. b This ‘confirmation bias’ corresponds to 
the z-transformed combination of the information search bias and information evaluation biases. 
 
Check for interfering effects and psychological processes 
We considered potential effects of gender, religious affiliation, and age. A 2 (prime: 
religious vs. non-religious) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) x 4 (religious affiliation: 
Catholicism vs. Evangelism vs. other denominations vs. no religious affiliation) ANCOVA 
with age as a covariate was performed. Participants’ age, gender, or religious affiliation did 
not significantly influence confirmatory information processing nor interact with the 
priming manipulation (Fs < 0.69, ps > .56).  
Additionally, we performed a regression analysis with confirmatory information 
processing as the dependent variable and manipulation of salience (one dummy code), 
intrinsic religious orientation (standardized), and the two-way interaction as predictors. 
This analysis yielded no main effect or interaction (ps > .55), indicating that intrinsic 
religiosity is unlikely to moderate the effect of religious salience on confirmatory 
information processing. Similar results were obtained for extrinsic religiosity (ps > .17).8 
With respect to the affect measure, we conducted a 2 (prime: religious vs. non-religious) x 
3 (affect: positive affect, negative self-directed affect, psychological discomfort) mixed 
 
                                                 
8 In Study 10, we again checked whether levels of personal religiosity moderated the effect of religious 
priming on confirmatory information processing. In line with the results of Study 8, regression analyses 
yielded no significant main effects or interactions (ps > .05), indicating that neither intrinsic religiosity nor 
extrinsic religiosity are probable moderators. Therefore, we opted not to report these analyses again when 
discussing Study 10. 
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model ANOVA with affect as a within factor. The analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of affect, F(1.54, 134) = 113.56, p < .001, ² = .63 (with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction), illustrating that participants experienced more positive affect (M = 6.67, 
SD = 1.71) than psychological discomfort (M = 2.02, SD = 2.34) or negative self-directed 
affect (M = 2.26, SD = 2.17). Importantly, we found no interaction between the priming 
manipulation and affect, F(1.54, 134) = .06, p = .91. In sum, the experimental design had 
no effect on the affect measures. 
4.4.3 Discussion 
Study 8 provided evidence that reminders of religion can also reduce confirmatory 
information processing in decision scenarios with higher personal involvement. Religious 
affiliation had no impact on the effect of religious priming on confirmatory information 
processing. Furthermore, the strength of personal religiosity did not moderate this effect. 
As far as cognitive dissonance is concerned, we found no indications that changes in 
psychological discomfort mediate the effect of religious priming on confirmatory 
information processing. We also ruled out positive emotions or negative self-directed 
affect as possible mediators.9  
However, there is another alternative explanation for the effect of religious priming on 
confirmatory information processing, which must be addressed. Since the human brain is 
an interconnected network, the activation of a specific concept can spread to related 
concepts. Due to such “unintended processing effects” (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p. 270), 
religious primes are liable to activate mental concepts that are closely connected to 
religion, such as mortality or fairness (Rounding, Lee, Jacobson, & Ji, 2012). 
With regard to mortality, activating religious concepts might have led participants to 
think about their own deaths. Recent research has supported a strong association between 
death and religion; for example, Norenzayan and Hansen (2006) demonstrated that 
reminders of death led Christian participants to report increased faith in supernatural 
 
                                                 
9 We measured participants’ personal discomfort, negative self-directed affect, and positive affect again in 
Study 10. Mediation analyses using a bootstrapping method (1,000 bootstrap samples) for small samples 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2004) did not reveal any reliable indirect effect of religious priming on confirmatory 
information processing for psychological discomfort [-.16, .06], negative self-directed affect [-.18, .02], or 
positive affect [-.16, .10] (95%-CI). This finding further indicates that differences in psychological 
discomfort, negative self-directed affect, or positive affect are unlikely to mediate the basic effect of religious 
priming on confirmatory information processing. 
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agents. As thoughts of mortality are experienced as threatening (Jonas & Fischer, 2006; 
Vail et al., 2010), coactivated mortality concepts could have induced a “cautious mindset” 
(Fischer, Greitemeyer, et al., 2008, p. 390) when processing decision-relevant information. 
Thus, reminders of religion may lead to decreases in confirmatory information processing 
by making thoughts of mortality salient.10 
Another plausible explanation that we have to take into account is that religious salience 
might have spread to fairness concepts. Since morality and fairness are deeply rooted in 
religion (Baumeister et al., 2010), participants might have adopted a mindset of ‘fair’ 
decision making and information processing following a religious prime. More 
specifically, participants might have been motivated to weigh pros and cons carefully in 
order to avoid being unfair or discriminatory. As a consequence, participants could have 
become more balanced in their search for and evaluation of information (Johnston, 1996; 
Lundgren & Prislin, 1998).  
Alternative explanations regarding mortality salience and fairness salience were thus 
addressed in Study 9. Furthermore, it is possible that our use of rather explicit priming 
techniques in Studies 7 and 8 may have introduced experimental demand effects. We 
therefore opted to employ more subtle priming procedures in the remaining studies. 
4.5 Study 9 
In Study 9, we hypothesized that participants in the religious prime condition would 
exhibit weaker confirmatory information processing tendencies than individuals who were 
primed with non-religious, mortality, or fairness concepts. 
  
 
                                                 
10 Research on mortality salience and confirmatory information processing is not uniform. For example, 
Jonas et al. (2003) suggested that confirmatory information processing may be unaffected or even increased 
when participants are primed with mortality. 
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4.5.1 Method 
Participants and design  
One hundred and twenty-eight students participated in this study. Ten subjects were 
excluded from the final sample due to missing data (2), suspicion (3), or the revision of 
their preliminary decision (5). The final sample consisted of 118 participants (106 female, 
12 male, age ranged from 18 to 44; M = 21.00, SD = 3.17). 93.2% of the subjects indicated 
identification with a religious affiliation (78.8% Catholicism, 12.7% Evangelism, 1.7% 
other denominations). The study was based on a one-factorial design with four 
experimental between-subjects conditions (prime: religious vs. non-religious vs. mortality 
vs. fairness). Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
Materials and procedure 
We used the scrambled sentence paradigm (Srull & Wyer, 1979) as our priming 
manipulation. This task presents participants with ten sets of five randomly presented 
words and requires them to construct grammatically correct, four-word sentences by 
eliminating one word from each set. In the religious prime condition, half of the scrambled 
sentences contained words associated with religion (prophets, spirit, divine, God, sacred; 
see Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007) and half of the sentences did not. In the non-religious 
control condition, we used words that were unrelated to religion and formed no coherent 
concept (scientists, cloth, great, bound, much). Participants in the mortality prime 
condition unscrambled sentences that contained words related to death (coffin, lethal, skull, 
corpse, murder), and participants in the fairness prime condition were met with words that 
have fairness connotations (moral, values, fair, responsibility, conscience). 
After completing the scrambled sentence task, participants were asked to imagine that 
they had the opportunity to invest 10,000 € in one of two companies, which both had sound 
financial footing, yet mixed prospects. The two companies were the ‘Nor-AG’ (a 
developer, manufacturer, and distributor of printing machines) and the ‘Mag-AG’ (which 
performed the same roles, but for milling machines). Participants were told that both 
companies really existed, but had been made anonymous for data protection purposes. 
After reading some background information about the two companies, participants made a 
tentative decision regarding which one they would invest in. 
Next, participants were given the opportunity to consider additional information 
pertaining to the decision case. They were informed that this additional information 
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consisted of 12 one-page comments written by economic analysts. Participants received a 
list that contained a two-sentence summary of each comment’s main argument. Overall, six 
pieces of information supported an investment in the Nor-AG (three pieces of information 
in favor of the Nor-AG and three pieces of information against the Mag-AG), and six 
pieces of information supported an investment in the Mag-AG (three pieces of information 
in favor of the Mag-AG and three pieces of information against the Nor-AG). Therefore, 
each participant was faced with six pieces of decision-consistent information and six pieces 
of decision-inconsistent information, irrespective of their preliminary choice. An example 
of an argument supporting investing in the Nor-AG was: “According to the company 
report, the Nor-AG had a successful last quarter concerning incoming orders. Thus, 
investors may well expect a high dividend.” An example of an argument opposing an 
investment in the Mag-AG was: “In contrast to competitors’ products, products of the 
Mag-AG only appeal to a small consumer group. This is why sales of the Mag-AG have 
stagnated.” Participants evaluated the credibility and importance of all of the available 
pieces of information (0 = not at all, 10 = extremely) and indicated whether they wished to 
read the corresponding full-page comments in detail. We computed difference values for 
information credibility, information importance, and information search by subtracting the 
corresponding values for decision-inconsistent information from the values for decision-
consistent information. For the following analyses, the three difference values were 
transformed into z-values and subsumed under an overall index of confirmatory 
information processing (α = .73). After the participants completed the information search 
and evaluation, they were asked to make a final investment decision. Upon doing so, the 
experiment ended, and participants were fully debriefed. 
4.5.2 Results 
Confirmatory information processing  
One sample t-tests against zero revealed that participants in the non-religious control 
condition had a confirmatory bias (M = 0.22, SD = 0.68), which differed from zero on a 
marginally significant level, t(29) = 1.80, p = .08. In contrast, participants in the religious 
prime condition exhibited a significant disconfirmatory bias (M = -0.38, SD = 0.80), 
t(29) = -2.62, p = .01. Confirmatory information processing in the mortality (M = 0.13, 
SD = 0.80) and fairness (M = 0.04, SD = 0.69) prime conditions did not significantly differ 
from zero (ts < .76, ps > .45). 
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A one-way ANOVA (prime: religious vs. non-religious vs. fairness vs. mortality) with 
confirmatory information processing as the dependent variable revealed a significant effect 
of the priming manipulation, F(3, 114) = 3.53, p = .02, ² = .09. Post hoc tests showed that 
participants in the religious prime condition exhibited a significantly lower confirmatory 
bias than either participants in the non-religious control condition (p = .003), participants 
in the mortality prime condition (p = .01), or individuals in the fairness prime condition 
(p = .04). We found no differences in confirmatory information processing between the 
non-religious control, fairness prime, and mortality prime conditions (ps > .35). For an 
overview of the results, see Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. Means and standard deviations for information search and combined z-
transformed confirmation bias (search and evaluation) as a function of experimental 
condition in Study 9. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
(combined) b 
Prime M SD  M SD  M SD 
Religious (n = 30) 
Non-religious (n = 30)  
Fairness (n = 29) 
Mortality (n = 29) 
2.50 
3.83 
3.14 
3.76 
1.41 
1.76 
1.48 
1.64 
 
3.13 
3.40 
3.21 
3.55 
1.57
1.59
1.66
1.62
 
-0.38 
0.22 
0.04 
0.13 
0.80 
0.68 
0.70 
0.92 
Notes. a Six pieces of information were available in each category. b This ‘confirmation bias’ corresponds to 
the z-transformed combination of the information search bias and information evaluation biases. 
 
Check for interfering effects 
A 4 (prime: religious vs. non-religious vs. fairness vs. mortality) x 2 (gender: female vs. 
male) x 4 (religious affiliation: Catholicism vs. Evangelism vs. other denominations vs. no 
religious affiliation) ANCOVA with age as a covariate was performed. We found no main 
effects for or interactions with the experimental manipulation for religious affiliation, 
gender, or age (Fs < 1.38, ps > .25). 
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4.5.3 Discussion 
Study 9 utilized a more implicit priming technique than the one used in Studies 1 and 2, 
but replicated their findings: In comparison to a control group, a group primed with 
religion demonstrated reduced levels of confirmatory information processing. This enables 
us to rule out manipulation-related demand characteristics as an explanation of the effect of 
religious salience on confirmatory information processing. Furthermore, we showed that 
the more balanced information processing tendencies exhibited by individuals exposed to a 
religious prime cannot be explained by the coactivation of mortality or fairness concepts – 
neither mortality nor fairness primes resulted in more balanced information processing, but 
religious primes did. Now that we have ruled out possible alternative explanations, in 
Studies 10 and 11, we attempt to shed more light on the psychological process that we 
believe underlies our main findings. 
4.6 Study 10 
In this experiment, we investigated whether reminders of religion might attenuate 
confirmatory information processing by buffering post-decisional conflicts and diverting 
participants’ thoughts away from their decisions. Previous research has provided evidence 
that confirmatory information search can be influenced by whether the individual focuses 
on the decision or not. For example, Jonas et al. (2001) demonstrated that participants who 
concentrated on a prior decision exhibited increased commitment to it, and that this 
increase in commitment then triggered a confirmatory information search. In contrast, 
shifting participants’ foci away from the decision decreased participants’ commitment to it 
and thus reduced confirmatory information search. The authors concluded that differences 
in commitment to a decision mediate the effect of decision focus on measures of 
confirmatory information processing, as commitment reflects “the decision’s salience in 
the mind” (Jonas et al., 2008, p. 1181; see also Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995). 
Against this theoretical background, we argue that if religious primes take an individual’s 
focus off the decisional conflict, they should also weaken the individual’s commitment to 
the preliminary decision. We measured commitment in two experimental conditions and 
hypothesized that religious priming would decrease personal commitment to a decision, 
subsequently attenuating confirmatory information processing. 
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4.6.1 Method 
Participants and design 
Eighty-five subjects participated in this experiment. Nine participants were excluded due to 
incomplete questionnaires (1), systematic response tendencies (1), or the revision of their 
preliminary decision (7). Seventy-six participants (56 female and 20 male, age ranged from 
13 to 59 years; M = 25.95, SD = 9.30) remained in the final sample. 97.4% of the 
participants stated that they were affiliated with Christian religion (86.8% Catholicism, 
10.5% Evangelism). The experiment was based on a one-factorial design with two 
experimental between-subjects conditions (prime: religious vs. non-religious). 
Materials and procedure 
Following previous research, we used a word search puzzle to prime participants with 
religious concepts (see Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; 
Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007). Participants received a piece of paper with an 11 x 11 
matrix of letters and a list of seven words and were tasked with finding the words within 
the matrix and highlighting them with a pen. The experimenter explained that the words 
could be placed horizontally, vertically, or diagonally and could be written either forwards 
or backwards. In the religious prime condition, three of the seven words were associated 
with religion (prophet, faith, God), whereas the non-religious prime control condition 
included three items related to sports (dancing, training, swimming). In both conditions, 
the remaining four words were distractors with no coherent theme (stairs, office, 
handkerchief, hammer; see Pichon et al., 2007). Participants were randomly assigned to 
either the religious prime condition or the non-religious prime control condition. 
After completing the word search, subjects proceeded to the decision case, which was 
identical to the one employed in Study 7 (the Mr. Miller decision case). As in the previous 
studies, we transformed the three difference values (credibility, importance, search) into z-
values and integrated them into an overall index of confirmatory information processing 
(α = .79). We checked for commitment by asking participants to indicate the extent to 
which they (a) were sure that they had made the right choice, (b) identified with their 
decision, and (c) felt bound by their decision (0 = not at all, 10 = extremely). Since these 
three variables were highly correlated (rs > .43, ps < .01), they were collapsed into a scale 
of commitment (α = .78). On completing the experiment, participants were thanked and 
thoroughly debriefed. 
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4.6.2 Results 
Confirmatory information processing and commitment 
Participants in the control group exhibited no confirmatory bias (M = 0.24, SD = 0.91), 
t(37) = 1.60, p = .12. In contrast, we found a marginally significant disconfirmatory bias 
when religious concepts were salient (M = -0.20, SD = 0.70), t(38) = -1.80, p = .08. 
Participants in the religious prime condition exhibited significantly decreased 
tendencies of confirmatory information processing (M = -0.20, SD = 0.70) compared to 
participants in the control condition (M = 0.24, SD = 0.91), F(1, 74) = 5.66, p = .02, 
² = .07. Furthermore, participants who were primed with religious concepts reported 
significantly less commitment to their initial decision (M = 5.34, SD = 1.99) than 
participants who were primed with non-religious concepts (M = 6.68, SD = 1.90), 
F(1, 74) = 8.89, p = .004, ² = .11.  
We thus tested whether the effect of religious priming on confirmatory information 
processing was mediated by differences in commitment. A bootstrapping analysis (1,000 
bootstrap samples) was performed (Preacher & Hayes, 2004), yielding a significant direct 
effect of priming on confirmatory information processing (t = -2.38, p = .02), which was 
reduced to non-significance (t = -1.55, p = .12) when controlling for the mediator 
‘commitment’. The true indirect effect was estimated to lie between -.42 and -.04 with 
95% confidence. Because zero is not in the confidence interval, we can conclude that the 
real indirect effect became significant at p < .05. Decreased commitment to the chosen 
decision alternative thus appears to mediate the effect of religious priming on confirmatory 
information processing. For an overview of the results, see Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4. Means and standard deviations for information search and combined z-
transformed confirmation bias (search and evaluation) as a function of experimental 
condition in Study 10. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
(combined) b 
Prime M SD  M SD  M SD 
Religious (n = 39) 
Non-religious (n = 37) 
3.51 
3.92 
1.71 
1.64 
 
3.28 
2.92 
1.52
1.57
 
-0.20 
0.24 
0.70 
0.91 
Notes. a Six pieces of information were available in each category. b This ‘confirmation bias’ corresponds to 
the z-transformed combination of the information search bias and information evaluation biases. 
 
Check for interfering effects 
A 2 (prime: religious vs. non-religious) x 2 (gender: female vs. male) x 4 (religious 
affiliation: Catholicism vs. Evangelism vs. other denominations vs. no religious affiliation) 
MANCOVA with age as a covariate was computed for confirmatory information 
processing and commitment. We found that male participants were marginally more 
committed to their decision than female participants, F(1, 65) = 4.12, p = .05, ² = .06. 
However, with regard to commitment, gender did not interact with the experimental 
conditions, F(1, 65) = 0.72, p = .40. No further main effects were observed for gender, 
religious affiliation, or age (Fs < 2.52, ps > .08). Importantly, the results also indicated that 
gender, religious affiliation, and age did not interact with the priming manipulation 
(Fs < 1.96, ps > .16). 
4.6.3 Discussion 
As predicted, we found that differences in commitment mediated the effect of religious 
priming on confirmatory information processing. Subtle reminders of religion decreased 
participants’ levels of commitment to their decisions, which in turn reduced levels of 
confirmatory information processing. These results support the assumption that religious 
primes take participants’ foci away from the decision and its associated conflict. However, 
it should be noted that a limitation of Study 10 is that our mediation test was based on a 
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correlational analysis, which prevents us from unambiguously determining the causal 
direction of the mediation effect. In order to gather further evidence for the assumption that 
religious salience draws participants’ foci away from the decision, we thus conducted 
Study 11.  
4.7 Study 11 
In Study 11, we investigated whether religious primes encourage individuals to focus on 
religious ideas rather than their secular decisions, thus reducing confirmatory information 
processing. This assumption suggests that religious primes may not be able to attenuate 
confirmatory information processing in decision scenarios that are related to religion, as 
reminders of religion cannot divert participants’ thoughts away from a decision that is tied 
to religion. Hence, we included both a secular and a religion-related decision case 
subsequently in this study. 
4.7.1 Method 
Participants and design  
Fifty-three subjects participated in this experiment, which was based on a 2 (prime: 
religious vs. non-religious) x 2 (decision case: secular vs. religious) with repeated 
measures on the last factor. Five subjects had to be excluded from the dataset because of 
missing data (2) or the revision of their initial decision (3). This left a final sample of 48 
participants (32 female and 16 male, age ranged from 17 to 58 years; M = 26.42, 
SD = 9.12). We did not ask participants to indicate their religious affiliation, as affiliation 
did not produce any interfering effects in our prior studies. 
Materials and procedure 
The priming procedure was identical to that in Study 9 (the scrambled sentence paradigm; 
Srull & Wyer, 1979). Following the manipulation, participants completed two decision 
cases that were presented in a randomized order. We used the Mr. Miller decision case as 
our secular decision problem (see Studies 7 and 10) and also employed a new decision case 
involving religiously motivated terrorism.  
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This case asked whether or not fundamental rights should be limited to protect against 
religiously motivated terrorism. Participants received general information about the topic 
and were informed that the German Federal Government was going to increase various 
security measures against this type of terrorism. However, this security increase would 
necessitate the restriction of some fundamental rights (e.g., inviolability of the privacy of 
correspondence, mail, or telephone; inviolability of the home). After making a preliminary 
decision, participants received a list summarizing 12 pieces of additional information in 
short statements (2 sentences). Half of the statements supported limiting fundamental 
rights to protect against terrorism and half opposed it. An example of a supportive 
statement was: “When fundamental rights are limited, it is easier to identify, detain, and 
incapacitate potential terrorists. Thus, fundamental rights should be limited.” An example 
of a statement opposing the limitation of fundamental rights was: “The limitation of 
fundamental rights increases the risk that the members of minority groups will be 
discriminated. Thus, fundamental rights should not be limited.” Overall, half of the pieces 
of information were consistent – and half inconsistent – with the participants’ preliminary 
decision, regardless of the option they had chosen. As in the previous studies, participants 
indicated the expected credibility and importance of each piece of information (0 = not at 
all, 10 = extremely) as well as whether they wished to read an extended version of the 
corresponding argument. Participants could select freely from the available pieces of 
information and eventually made their final decisions. On doing so, the experiment was 
concluded, and participants were fully debriefed and told that no extended versions of the 
articles existed. Furthermore, it was ensured that nobody left the laboratory with any 
negative emotions related to terrorism.  
For each decision case, we computed difference values for information credibility, 
information importance, and information search by subtracting the corresponding values 
for decision-inconsistent information from the values for decision-consistent information. 
For the following analyses, the three difference values were transformed into z-values and 
integrated into an overall index of confirmatory information processing (Mr. Miller 
decision case: α = .88; religious terrorism decision case: α = .87). 
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4.7.2 Results 
Confirmatory information processing 
One sample t-tests against zero revealed that participants in the non-religious control 
condition exhibited no significant tendencies of confirmatory information processing, 
either in the secular decision case (M = 0.24, SD = 0.91), tsecular(22) = 1.28, p = .21, or in 
the religious decision case (M = -0.10, SD = 0.91), treligious(22) = -0.54, p = .60. Similarly, 
in the religious priming condition, we found no significant biases for the secular decision 
case (M = -0.22, SD = 0.85), tsecular(24) = -1.32, p = .20, or the religious decision case 
(M = 0.09, SD = 0.88), treligious(24) = -0.54, p = .60. 
A 2 (prime: religious vs. non-religious) x 2 (decision case: secular vs. religious) mixed 
model ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and confirmatory information 
processing as the dependent variable revealed a significant interaction between prime and 
decision case, F(1, 46) = 5.50, p = .02, ² = .11. No main effects were observed (Fs < 0.41, 
ps > .52). The nature of the interaction can be seen in Figure 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Confirmation bias (combined) as a function of experimental condition in 
Study 11. Error bars represent standard errors.  
Simple effects analyses were carried out separately for the secular and religious decision 
cases. When participants made a secular decision, we found marginally significant, lower 
levels of confirmatory information processing for participants who were primed with 
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religious concepts (M = -0.22, SD = 0.85) compared to participants primed with non-
religious concepts (M = 0.24, SD = 0.91), F(1, 46) = 3.38, p = .07, ² = .07. In contrast, we 
found no differences in confirmatory information processing between the religious prime 
condition (M = 0.09, SD = 0.88) and the control condition (M = -0.10, SD = 0.91), 
F(1, 46) = 0.57, p = .45, in the religious decision case. For an overview of the results, see 
Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5. Means and standard deviations for information search and combined z-
transformed confirmation bias (search and evaluation) as a function of experimental 
condition in Study 11. 
 Information search    
 Consistent a  Inconsistent a  Confirmation bias 
(combined) b 
Experimental condition M SD  M SD  M SD 
Religious prime / Secular 
decision (n = 25) 
Non-religious prime / Secular 
decision (n = 23)  
Religious prime / Religious 
decision (n = 25) 
Non-religious prime / 
Religious decision (n = 23) 
3.52
 
4.39
 
4.52
 
3.78 
2.00
 
0.99
 
1.19
 
1.24 
 
3.04 
 
3.00 
 
3.12 
 
2.74 
1.90
 
1.51
 
1.74
 
1.57
 
-0.22 
 
0.24 
 
0.09 
 
-0.10 
0.85 
 
0.91 
 
0.88 
 
0.91 
Notes. a Six pieces of information were available in each category. b This ‘confirmation bias’ corresponds to 
the z-transformed combination of the information search bias and information evaluation biases. 
 
Check for interfering effects 
We checked for potential interfering effects of gender and age by conducting a 2 (prime: 
religious vs. non-religious) x 2 (decision case: secular vs. religious) x 2 (gender: female vs. 
male) mixed model ANCOVA with repeated measures on the second factor and age as a 
covariate. No significant main effects or interactions occurred for either gender or age 
(Fs < 2.81, ps > .10).  
We also checked whether the order the decision cases were presented in might create an 
interfering effect. We found a marginally significant main effect of presentation order, 
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F(1, 44) = 3.90, p = .06, ² = .02, indicating that, overall, confirmatory information 
processing was higher when the secular decision case preceded the religious decision case 
(M = 0.20, SD = 0.79) compared to when the religious decision case was presented first 
(M = -0.17, SD = 0.65). More importantly, presentation order did not significantly interact 
with the experimental conditions (Fs < 2.40, ps > .12). 
4.7.3 Discussion 
In summary, Study 11 found that participants who were primed with religion exhibited 
reduced levels of confirmatory information processing compared to a control group when 
making a secular decision. In contrast, reminders of religion did not attenuate confirmatory 
information processing when the decision scenario was itself related to religion. However, 
this study has a methodical problem regarding the religious decision case. This is because 
its discussion of religious terrorism may have induced a sense of threat in our participants, 
which might have affected our results. However, our overall findings can be considered 
additional evidence for our suggestion that religious primes divert participants’ thoughts 
away from the decision and toward religious ideas when individuals are faced with post-
decisional conflicts.  
4.8 General discussion 
The five present studies show that reminders of religion attenuate confirmatory 
information processing in secular decision scenarios. We consistently found this pattern of 
results across four different priming procedures (short essay, rating task, scrambled 
sentence task, word search puzzle) and three different decision scenarios (Mr. Miller 
decision case, eBook decision case, investment decision case), which suggests that this 
effect may be generalized. We also showed that this effect is unlikely to be due to either 
cognitive dissonance processes (Study 8) or the coactivation of fairness or mortality 
concepts (Study 9). In Study 10, differences in subjective commitment to the chosen 
decision alternative mediated the effect of religion on confirmatory information 
processing: Individuals who were primed with religious concepts indicated less 
commitment to their decision, which resulted in decreased levels of confirmatory 
information processing. In Study 11, we found a boundary condition for our basic effect: 
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Reminders of religion did not attenuate confirmatory information processing in a decision 
case that was itself related to religion. Notably, levels of personal religiosity did not 
moderate the effect of religious priming on confirmatory information processing (Studies 8 
and 10).  
Our findings provide initial evidence that religion might influence day-to-day decision 
making, as religious primes attenuate confirmatory information processing (see also 
Baumeister et al., 2010). More specifically, our results suggest that religious primes reduce 
levels of confirmatory information processing by diverting individuals’ thoughts away 
from the decision and its associated conflict. This is in line with recent research showing 
that religion guards against the experience of conflict by shifting individual “thought and 
perception” away from the source of discrepancy (Inzlicht et al., 2009, p. 386). Our 
findings provide particular support for the notion that reminders of religion divert peoples’ 
thoughts away from conflicts related to the decision: Individuals who were primed with 
religion exhibited reduced levels of commitment to their decision (i.e., thought less about 
their decision), which is why they might have become less critical of decision-inconsistent 
information. However, it should be noted that religious primes could also have affected 
participants’ perceptions of decision-inconsistent information. For example, individuals 
primed with religion may have perceived decision-inconsistent information as conflicting 
less with their decision than members of a control group with no religious priming. By 
perceiving less conflict in this information, individuals may thus actively search for and 
more positively evaluate it.11 Further research is needed to examine the processes 
underlying the effect of religious priming on confirmatory information processing more 
closely. 
The present studies demonstrate that even subtle reminders of religion can affect the 
subsequent processing of decision-relevant information. This finding is of particular 
importance when considering the major role played by religious traditions in our cultural 
context (Hommel & Colzato, 2010) as well as the high prevalence of religious symbols in 
everyday life. For example, many well-known and popular musicians use religious 
imaginary and metaphors in their song lyrics (e.g., Bruce Springsteen, Coldplay, Kanye 
West). Listening to such lyrics may remind people of God and potentially affect 
subsequent information processing.  
 
                                                 
11 We would like to thank Prof. Gesine Dreisbach for this important idea.  
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In addition, our findings suggest that religious primes affect confirmatory information 
processing independent of individuals’ levels of religiosity. This may initially appear 
counter-intuitive, as religious concepts should be more readily accessible to individuals 
who believe in God. However, these findings are in line with recent studies that have 
reported religious priming effects regardless of participants’ pre-existing levels of 
religiosity (e.g., Randolph-Seng & Nielsen, 2007).12 With this in mind, it is highly 
important to further investigate effects of religious primes on psychological processes. 
Another important limitation is that our research is based only on German samples, which 
predominantly consisted of Christian participants. It would be of particular interest to 
explore the effects of religious primes on confirmatory information processing among 
members of other cultures and religions. 
A limitation of our research is that we did not find the basic effect of confirmatory 
information processing for one of the decision cases (the Mr. Miller decision case in Study 
7). This seems to stand in opposition to previous selective exposure research, which has 
found evidence of biased information processing when employing this scenario. However, 
Fischer et al. (2005) have noted that this specific case may be problematic: Since 
participants’ final decisions might result in a named individual losing their employment, 
they might be motivated to make a fair decision, in turn leading to more balanced 
information processing. However, this limitation does not affect the main finding of the 
present studies, as various manipulations can cause relative differences in information 
search and evaluation, irrespective of the level of confirmatory information processing 
displayed by control groups (e.g., Jonas et al., 2003).  
Future research on confirmatory information processing should also address the 
question of whether it is only religious primes that decrease confirmatory information 
processing or whether this effect could be extrapolated to the external meaning systems 
that provide individuals with a sense of stability and control (see also Kay et al., 2008). For 
example, thinking of a stable government might also buffer the aversive experience of 
incoming decision-inconsistent information and could thereby lead to balanced information 
processing.  
 
                                                 
12 We used an explicit measure of personal religiosity and measured participants’ levels of religiosity at the 
end of the experiments. Future research should attempt to replicate our findings using implicit measures of 
religiosity or by measuring participants’ levels of religiosity in a preliminary study. 
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Furthermore, future studies should investigate whether reminders of religion decrease or 
increase confirmatory information processing when the decisions at hand involve religious 
values, such as those on contraception (see also Iyer, 2002) or sexual abstinence (see also 
Paul, Fitzjohn, Eberhart-Phillips, Herbison, & Dickson, 2000). We expect that religious 
primes would increase confirmatory information processing tendencies in decision 
scenarios that address religious values, as reminders of religion should intensify the focus 
on decisions that are directly connected with religious doctrines.  
In conclusion, the present investigation is a starting point for exploring the effects of 
religion on decision making and confirmatory information processing. Our findings 
suggest that, counter to common perceptions linking religiosity to closed-mindedness, 
there are certain circumstances under which reminders of religion make individuals more 
open-minded (cf. Sagioglou & Forstmann, 2013). The finding that religious primes 
increase individuals’ openness to decision-inconsistent information is of particular 
practical relevance, as several studies have revealed that neglecting decision-inconsistent 
information leads to poor decision outcomes (Janis, 1982; Kray & Galinsky, 2003). 
Reminders of religion may thus improve the quality of decisions by decreasing 
confirmatory biases.  
5. General conclusion 
General conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate whether randomness affects 
confirmatory information processing in social and economic decision making. This 
relationship was explored for three distinct dimensions of randomness, namely (a) physical 
randomness, (b) social randomness, and (c) metaphysical randomness. 
In a first step, Study Series 1 provided evidence for the role of physical randomness in 
confirmatory information processing (Chapter 2). The results showed that high physical 
randomness (i.e., contextual disorder) has a de-biasing effect on confirmatory information 
processing. People who made a decision in a disorderly room were less likely to engage in 
confirmatory information processing (and were even more likely to engage in 
disconfirmatory information processing) than individuals who made a decision in an 
orderly room. It was also found that the relationship between disorder and confirmatory 
information processing is not due to the mere salience of disorder concepts, but rather to 
the specific characteristics of contextual disorder. Furthermore, only activating both – 
disorder concepts and divergent thinking – reduced levels of confirmatory information 
search. Summarizing, the first study series provided initial evidence that high levels of 
physical randomness decrease confirmatory information processing.  
In a second step, the present research investigated the impact of social randomness on 
confirmatory information processing (Chapter 3). Four studies consistently found that 
while high social randomness (i.e., low perceived levels of personal control) increases 
confirmatory information search, it does not affect confirmatory information evaluation. 
The mechanism that drives this effect seems to be located in heightened feelings of 
helplessness: Individuals who perceived themselves as having little control reported 
increased feelings of helplessness, which in turn strengthened confirmatory information 
search. Alternative explanations based on feelings of general threat or on the need for 
cognitive closure were ruled out.  
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Study Series 2 also showed that the severity of personal consequences for the decision 
maker moderates the effect of social randomness on confirmatory information search. 
Though perceived control affected confirmatory information search when decision 
consequences were low, it had no impact on confirmatory information processing for high-
consequence decision problems. Taken together, these findings suggest that high levels of 
social randomness increase confirmatory information search in situations where decision 
makers’ choices do not elicit the risk of serious personal consequences. These results stand 
in sharp contrast to the findings of Study Series 1, which showed that high levels of 
physical randomness decrease confirmatory information processing. 
In a final step, Study Series 3 (Chapter 4) investigated the impact of metaphysical 
randomness on confirmatory information processing. Five studies found that low 
metaphysical randomness (i.e., religious priming) attenuates confirmatory information 
processing in secular decision scenarios. In particular, people who were primed with 
religious concepts exhibited lower levels of confirmatory information processing than 
participants in a control group. Moreover, the relationship between religious priming and 
confirmatory information processing was mediated by differences in subjective 
commitment: Individuals who were primed with religious concepts reported less 
commitment to their decision, which in turn decreased confirmatory information 
processing. In addition, it was ruled out that cognitive dissonance or co-activated fairness 
and mortality concepts could serve as alternative explanations for the observed effect. In 
sum, the final study series indicated that low metaphysical randomness reduces 
confirmatory information processing. Notably, the present findings for metaphysical 
randomness and social randomness point in a similar direction: Both social and 
metaphysical randomness seem to be positively related to confirmatory information 
processing. 
Collectively, the three study series described in the present thesis converge to a general 
conclusion: Randomness affects confirmatory information processing, no matter whether it 
occurs in one’s physical, social, or metaphysical environment. However, the effects are not 
uniform. Whereas physical randomness seems to be negatively related to confirmatory 
information processing, social and metaphysical randomness are rather positively 
associated with confirmatory information processing.  
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5.2 Implications 
The present findings for the effects of physical, social, and metaphysical randomness on 
confirmatory information processing have major theoretical and practical implications. 
With the specific implications for the distinct dimensions of randomness having been 
addressed in detail in their respective chapters, this section will focus on the theoretical and 
practical implications of the present research as a whole.  
5.2.1 Theoretical implications 
Firstly, the present findings provide valuable theoretical implications for research on 
confirmatory information processing. Although current theoretical accounts (e.g., cognitive 
accounts; Fischer et al., 2005; Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, et al., 2008) and recent research (e.g., 
Fischer et al., 2010; Fischer, Greitemeyer, et al., 2008) have pointed out that researchers 
should consider both information search and evaluation when investigating selectivity in 
decision making processes, the majority of studies have tended to address either selective 
exposure or biased assimilation (e.g., Fischer, Jonas, et al., 2008; Greitemeyer, Fischer, 
Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2009). Extending this rather narrow research focus, the present 
study series provided valuable evidence for the effects of randomness on both confirmatory 
information search and evaluation. In particular, it was shown that physical randomness 
and metaphysical randomness affect confirmatory information search and evaluation, while 
social randomness only impacts confirmatory information search. Future research will 
need to further explore the relevant circumstances under which the effects of confirmatory 
information search and evaluation occur, be it simultaneously or independent of each other.  
Secondly, the present research adds to a limited body of literature examining those 
potential moderators of confirmatory information processing that are not part of the 
decision making process per se (e.g., Fischer, Kastenmüller, et al., 2011). It remains of 
critical importance to explore decision-unrelated influences on confirmatory information 
processing, as decision makers often face various situational influences that may 
potentially impair decision quality. One such highly-common factor in everyday life is the 
degree of order in one’s environment, or else its randomness. Notably, previous research 
had not addressed the specific impact of randomness on confirmatory information 
processing before. Thus, the present research also contributes to closing this particular 
research gap. 
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Thirdly, an additional theoretical contribution made by this thesis comes from its 
comprehensive approach to investigating randomness. In contrast to previous studies of 
randomness, this research did not simply explore whether a general impression of 
randomness (or a single dimension of randomness) affects the outcome variable (e.g., 
Legare & Souza, 2013; Vohs et al., 2013). Instead, three distinct dimensions of 
randomness (i.e., physical randomness, social randomness, metaphysical randomness) 
were included, in order to provide a more complete picture of how randomness influences 
confirmatory information processing.  
Importantly, physical, social, and metaphysical randomness were found to affect 
confirmatory information processing in different ways: High physical randomness 
decreased confirmatory information processing, whereas high social randomness increased 
confirmatory information search. Similar to the findings for social randomness, low 
metaphysical randomness reduced confirmatory information processing. These mixed 
results suggest that a one-size-fits-all approach is not ideally suited for investigating the 
potential effects of randomness; that is, the impact of randomness on one outcome variable 
should not be judged by empirically manipulating a general sense of randomness (or just 
one single dimension of randomness). Instead, it would be a fruitful endeavor for future 
research to further investigate effects of randomness by using a more comprehensive 
approach that builds upon a multidimensional conception of randomness.  
Furthermore, the present research not only showed that physical, social, and 
metaphysical randomness differently affect confirmatory information processing, but also 
provided valuable insights into the moderators that may strengthen or attenuate the 
observed effects. Even more importantly, the present research also shed light on the 
psychological processes that might drive these effects. As far as the impact of physical 
randomness on confirmatory information processing is concerned, no direct mediation 
effects were found. However, the results suggest that this effect could be driven by an 
increased level of cognitive openness toward the unexpected (for a more detailed 
discussion, see Chapter 2.5). In contrast, the effect of social randomness on confirmatory 
information search was mediated by increased feelings of helplessness; that is, individuals 
who perceived low control felt more helpless, and this in turn made them more biased in 
information search. Regarding metaphysical randomness, differences in subjective 
commitment to the decision were found to underlie the relationship between religious 
priming and confirmatory information processing.  
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In summary, distinct psychological mechanisms seem to drive the effects of physical, 
social, and metaphysical randomness on confirmatory information processing. The present 
findings can thus be considered an ideal starting point for investigating just how physical, 
social, and metaphysical randomness affect confirmatory information processing in 
personal and economic decision making. 
When taking a closer look at the overall picture of results, it is apparent that physical 
randomness seems to be negatively related to confirmatory information processing, with 
social and metaphysical randomness being rather more positively associated with it. Why 
might this be? One crucial difference between physical randomness and social or 
metaphysical randomness lies in their potential threat to an individual’s need to believe in 
an orderly and predictable world (see Kay et al., 2009). In particular, high levels of 
physical randomness (e.g., a chaotic room) may not pose a threat to this particular need, as 
physical disorder is highly localized (e.g., limited to the room) and can be eliminated quite 
easily (e.g., by cleaning up the room). In contrast, perceptions of high levels of social 
randomness (e.g., a lack of personal control) or metaphysical randomness (e.g., the absence 
of a controlling God) are likely to extend to other areas of life and cannot simply be 
‘turned off’. Thus, an existential threat might emanate from high social or metaphysical 
randomness.  
Against this background, high levels of randomness that do not pose a threat to an 
individual’s need to believe in an orderly and predictable world might be capable of 
promoting cognitive openness toward the unexpected and could thereby reduce 
confirmatory information processing (see Study Series 1). In contrast, if high levels of 
randomness threaten this specific need, decision makers seem to experience increased 
negative affect, which might be compensated for by increased levels of confirmatory 
information processing (see Study Series 2). From another perspective, perceiving a high 
level of order and structure in the world (e.g., provided by a controlling God) might render 
other coping mechanisms (e.g., confirmatory information processing when experiencing 
cognitive dissonance following a decision) unnecessary and could thereby reduce 
confirmatory information processing (see Study Series 3).  
In sum, one could argue that the effects of randomness on confirmatory information 
processing depend on whether high levels of randomness might threaten one’s need to 
believe in an orderly and predictable world. However, as the exact differences and parallels 
between physical, social, and metaphysical randomness are largely underexplored, future 
research is needed to further investigate these relationships. 
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5.2.2 Practical implications 
Beyond its theoretical implications, the present research is also of high practical relevance. 
When making personal and economic decisions, people often have to face highly random 
(and thus chaotic) circumstances. For example, they make decisions in cluttered 
conference rooms (i.e., high physical randomness); in times of economic uncertainty (i.e., 
high social randomness); or when they have doubts about the existence of a controlling 
God (i.e., high metaphysical randomness). It is thus highly valuable for research to 
investigate whether randomness affects decision making. The present research contributes 
to answering this question by demonstrating that physical, social, and metaphysical 
randomness represent major influences on confirmatory information processing following 
decisions.  
In order to make high quality decisions, it is essential that “the decision maker, to the 
best of his ability and within his information-processing capabilities […] correctly 
assimilates and takes account of any new information or expert statement to which he is 
exposed, even when the information or judgment does not support the course of action he 
initially prefers” (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 11). In other words, the tendency to prefer 
decision-consistent over decision-inconsistent information detrimentally affects decision 
quality by dissuading the revision of incorrect decisions (Janis, 1982; Kray & Galinsky, 
2003). Against this background, the present findings point to the potential risks emanating 
from the distinct randomness dimensions: Decision quality might be particularly impaired 
when individuals make decisions in orderly (vs. disorderly) physical environments; 
perceive low (vs. high) levels of personal control; or perceive low (vs. high) metaphysical 
order.  
From this perspective, it is also possible to specify effective countermeasures that might 
help avoid confirmatory biases in specific contexts (e.g., the workplace). For example, the 
finding that a disorderly physical environment was shown to reduce confirmatory 
information processing (and thus to potentially improve decision quality) might suggest 
that employers could benefit from relaxing ‘clean-desk-policy’-directives. Such directives 
usually require that employees clear up their workplaces before they depart from them. 
However, though clean and structured work environments might provide a good starting 
point for efficiently organizing and executing one’s daily work, messy workspaces seem to 
be more useful when major decisions are at stake. Thus, in order to promote high-quality 
decision making, employers could create specific working spaces (e.g., conference rooms) 
where a little chaos is not only permitted, but welcomed.  
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Employers could also benefit from heeding the finding that randomness perceived in the 
social environment increases confirmatory information processing and might subsequently 
compromise decision quality. This could be done by ensuring that employees experience 
personal control during their daily work, such as via attaching great importance to a 
reliable and predictable leadership style (e.g., ethically-oriented leadership; Peus, 
Kerschreiter, Frey, & Traut-Mattausch, 2010); establishing a predictable routine for day-
to-day work instead of putting employees under (unnecessary) stress; involving employees 
in employers’ goals and action plans; and avoiding exposing employees to extreme mental 
or mood changes.  
Additionally, the current data propose that decision quality could be further optimized 
by reminding decision makers of external sources of control. Thus, it seems reasonable for 
employers to underline the order and structure prevalent within their organizations in 
public statements or staff appraisals. More specifically, an employer could facilitate high-
quality decision making by pointing to their organization’s stable economic and financial 
situation; its high level of protection and job security; or its excellent internal solidarity.  
However, if a sense of non-randomness cannot be provided by the employee (e.g., at a 
time of economic crisis), it seems reasonable for decision makers to remind themselves of 
other areas in life where they experience personal control or external order, as these 
perceptions might ‘spill over’ to other domains (see Kay, Gaucher, et al., 2010; Kay et al., 
2008). Similarly, it seems plausible that classic coping strategies such as self-affirmation 
(i.e., the affirmation of core values) could also serve as a buffer against the aversive 
experience of high randomness and might thereby counteract confirmatory biases (Steele, 
1988; see also Hart et al., 2009). In sum, it would be a fruitful endeavor for future research 
to further investigate possible countermeasures to the effects of randomness on 
confirmatory information processing.  
5.3 Limitations 
Though the present research has provided new insights into the effects of randomness on 
confirmatory information processing, it has a number of limitations that need to be 
addressed. With the limitations of the separate study series being discussed in their 
respective chapters, this section will address the present research’s overall limitations.  
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One such flaw is that the present research was mainly based on student samples. 
Though students can often have a considerable amount of professional experience (due to 
vocational training qualifications or side jobs), it would be of particular interest to explore 
the effects of randomness on confirmatory information processing in professional decision 
makers. Specifically, future research should focus on field studies with professional 
decision makers in organizations (e.g., managers) in order to enhance the present results’ 
external validity. 
Another limitation concerns the psychological processes that might underlie the effects 
of physical, social, and metaphysical randomness on confirmatory information processing. 
With regard to physical randomness, the data presented in Study Series 1 do not answer the 
question of which specific mechanism drives the effect of contextual disorder on 
confirmatory information processing. As described in the general discussion of Study 
Series 1, increased levels of cognitive openness to the unexpected could account for the 
observed effect, but future research is needed to clarify this relationship.  
Additionally, it should be noted that the mediation tests indicating the potential 
psychological processes underlying the observed effects in Study Series 2 and 3 were 
based on correlational analyses. For this reason, the causal direction of the mediation 
effects cannot be unambiguously determined. Thus, future research should further 
investigate whether the proposed mechanisms actually drive the observed effects. 
A final limitation of the present research becomes apparent when comparing the 
experimental design for investigating physical and social randomness on the one hand and 
metaphysical randomness on the other. While Study Series 1 and 2 systematically 
compared high randomness, low randomness, and baseline conditions, Study Series 3 only 
addressed the differences between low randomness and baseline conditions. This limitation 
is owed to the fact that Study Series 3 utilized religious priming manipulations that make it 
difficult to create adequately matched high-randomness conditions. However, in future 
research it would be useful to determine a priming procedure that allows for such a match. 
One such approach could be to prime high metaphysical randomness by presenting 
Darwin’s Theory of Evolution in terms of an unpredictable and random process (Rutjens, 
van der Pligt, et al., 2010).  
In sum, while the present research can be considered a first step toward a more 
complete understanding of how randomness affects personal and economic decision 
making, additional research is needed to further elucidate the relationship between 
physical, social, and metaphysical randomness and confirmatory information processing.  
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5.4 Outlook 
The goal of the present thesis was to shed more light on the relationship between 
randomness and confirmatory information processing following personal and economic 
decisions. The results of eleven studies suggest that the effects of randomness on 
confirmatory information processing depend on the environment in which randomness is 
perceived: In some environments, high randomness seems to be experienced as aversive 
and is thus likely to increase selectivity, whereas in other environments, high randomness 
can inspire cognitive openness, subsequently decreasing confirmatory information 
processing. Thus, returning to the citation quoted in the introduction, the present findings 
suggest that chaos indeed “brings uneasiness, but […] also allows the opportunity for 
creativity and growth” (Tom Barrett). 
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